"HUGHENDEN" (S.S.).

In the matter of an Inquiry before Commander Warren Frederick Cabeen, C.B., R.N.R., Inspector for the Board of Trade, into the nature and causes of the accident that occurred to the British steamship "HUGHENDEN" (Official Number 109709), of the port of Sunderland, off Ushant, on or about the 21st day of December, 1911.

Report.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in virtue of my appointment from the Board of Trade, under Section 72 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, dated the 1st day of April, 1912, I held an inquiry on Sunday, the 21st day of December, 1911, at 2 p.m. at the Custom House Buildings, Sunderland, in the County of Durham, on the 23rd and 24th day of December, 1911.

Mr. William S. Burton (Messrs. Watson, Burton and Corder), solicitor, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, conducted the proceedings on behalf of the Solicitor to the Board of Trade (Sir Robert Ellis Cunliffe), and Mr. Richard S. Middleton, solicitor, Sunderland, represented the owners of the vessel and the relatives of the master.

The "Hughenden," Official Number 109709, was a British single-screw steamship, built of steel at Sunderland, in 1900, by Messrs. J. L. Thompson and Sons, Limited, North Sands, and was registered at the port of Sunderland.

She had a clipper bow with figure-head, was rigged as a three-masted schooner, and was of the following dimensions:---Length from the fore part of stem, over the bowsprit, to the aft side of the head of the stern post, 340 feet; main breadth to outside of planks, 43 feet; depth in hold from tonnage deck to ceiling at midships, 24 feet; and depth from top of deck at side to amidships to bottom of keel, 20.75 feet. Her gross tonnage was 3,000 tons, and her registered tonnage 2,909.39 tons.

She was built on the cellular double-bottom principle, and was propelled with six steel watertight bulkheads, carried right up to the spar deck.

Her co-efficient of fineness was 79.08, which shows that her model was about that of an average cargo steamship.

She was constructed with a top-gallant forecastle 31 feet long, a bridged deck 96 feet long, and a poop 40 feet long, these erections being 7 feet high. The forward well deck was 78 feet long and the after one 96 feet long. These wells had bulwarks 3 feet 9 inches high, provided with four walk-ports, in two pieces, on either side of the ship, each measuring 36 inches by 18 inches, and situated two before and two after the bridge.

She also had an iron bulwark 3 feet 3 inches high, round the bridge deck, provided with ports for the after doors.

There was a doorway, 2 feet 6 inches wide, fitted with steel water-tight doors, in front of the enclosed underbridge space on each side of the ship. There were also two doorways, 3 feet wide, in the front of the poop, for the closing of which provision had not been made by the builders.

The engine-room skylight, which was about 30 feet 9 inches above the bridge deck, was made of steel, and had two strong bulk's-eye lights in each shutter.

The fire casing was 7 feet high, had iron doors on either side, and was fitted with a hinged iron cover.

The master's accommodation was in a house on the forward part of the bridge deck (the chart-room and wheelhouse being above it) and the officers' and engineers' quarters were on the after part of the bridge deck alongside the engine-room skylight, respectively on the starboard and port sides. The crew were berthed under the forecastle forecastle fore and aft.

The "Hughenden" was propelled by triple-expansion engines of 200 nominal horse-power and 1,250 indicated horse-power, designed to give her a speed of 93 knots per hour, and was fitted with two boilers, having a working pressure of 150 lbs. to the square inch. She also had a donkey boiler, pressed to 150 lbs.

She had a circulating (sea or bilge) pump, two 4-inch bilge pumps, one ballast donkey pump, with a capacity of 100 tons per hour, and another small donkey pump equal to 30 tons per hour. The pumps had all necessary connections to ballast tanks and all compartments.

The engines and boilers were manufactured by Messrs. George Clark, Limited, of Southwick, Sunderland, at the same time that the vessel was built.

In addition to the pumps enumerated above, there was a Downton's hand pump, with connections to all compartments.

The vessel was furnished with steam steering-gear, by Messrs. John Lynn and Company, of Sunderland, the steering-wheel being in the wheelhouse on the upper bridge and the engine under the after part of the lower bridge, rods and chains, with a spring buffer on each side of the poop, leading to the quadrant. Hand gear was also provided on the poop.

She had four cargo hatchways, each measuring 24 feet by 14 feet 6 inches, all furnished with two athwartship beams, three fore-and-aft hatches, of 21-inch red wood, and the necessary cleats and battens.

There was a hatchway, measuring 8 feet 9 inches by 10 feet 6 inches, on the bridge deck, leading to the reserve bunker, and two bunker hatchways, each measuring 4 feet by 2 feet 6 inches. The poop had one hatchway, equaling 8 feet by 8 feet. All the hatchways could be properly secured.

No. 1 and 2 holds were each ventilated by two 18-inch cowl ventilators, having 12-inch internal tubes to the lower holds; the bunkers by two 17-inch ventilators through a derrick; the stowage by two 18-inch cowl ventilators; the engine-room by two 18-inch cowl ventilators; Nos. 3 and 4 holds each by two 18-inch cowl ventilators, with 13-inch tubes to lower holds; and the ventilation was carried through the after derrick. The flanges of the ventilators on the spar deck were 5 feet high, and on the erections 3 feet high.

Covers were supplied for the ventilators and wooden plugs for the flanges.

As before stated, the ship had six steel water-tight bulkheads, namely: No. 1, the collision bulkhead; No. 2, between No. 1 and No. 2 holds; No. 3, separating No. 2 hold from the stowage, with two water-tight doors in the between decks; No. 4, separating No. 2 hold from the stowage, with two water-tight doors to the lower hold, measuring 30 inches by 20 inches, worked by a red and red rod to the upper platform, and two small water-tight doors to the reserve bunker (which occupied a portion of No. 2 between decks only); No. 4, the engine-room bulkhead, with a water-tight door to the tunnel, measuring 30 inches by 20 inches, worked by a red and red rod to the top platform of the engine-room, and another small water-tight door on the port side of the main (or between) deck; No. 5, separating Nos. 3 and 4 holds, with water-tight doors in the between decks; and No. 6, the after peak bulkhead.
and 5 feet 6 inches abaft that, of the following capacity:—

| No. 1 (fore) | Tons | 94 |
| No. 2 (main) | 225 |
| No. 3 (engine-room, fresh water) | 63 |
| No. 4 (after) | 197 |
| No. 5 (after) | 102 |
| No. 6 (after peak) | 68 |
| No. 7 (after peak between decks) | 90 |

Total | 848 |

The gross cubic capacities of the different cargo spaces were as under:—

| Cubic Feet |
| No. 1 hold | 57,653 |
| between decks | 16,650 |
| No. 2 hold | 59,509 |
| between decks | 19,550 |
| No. 3 hold | 41,074 |
| between decks | 21,966 |
| No. 4 hold | 23,661 |
| between decks | 15,086 |
| Reserve bunker (between decks) | 8,170 |
| Bridge | 17,412 |
| Fore peak between decks | 3,365 |
| Poop | 7,569 |

Total | 208,145 |

On the 18th of August, 1900, the Committee of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping approved, on behalf of the Board of Trade, of a minimum water line for the ship of 6 feet 3 inches, and on the 30th of July, 1905, this was decreased by the same authority to 5 feet 2 inches.

It should be added that the vessel was built under special survey to the highest class at Lloyd’s.

She carried four boats (two of them lifeboats) with the prescribed equipment. The lifeboats were placed under davits, in chocks, on skids, abreast of the engine-room skyline, and the other boats were similarly placed abreast of the chart-room, the jolly-boat on the port side and the cutter on the starboard side.

For other life-saving appliances, she had six life-buoys and a life-belt for each member of the crew, as also some spare ones.

Lastly, she was owned by the Hugheiden Steamship Company, Limited, of Baltic Chambers, Sunderland, Messrs. John Henry Charlton and James Tompson, both of the same address, being the managers, by advice under the seal of the Company received on the 24th of August, 1900.

The “Hugheiden” was purchased by the above Company from the builders immediately after her launch for the sum of £45,000, and they had spent some £65,000 on her since.

In January, 1909, she passed her No. 2 survey at Sunderland, which occupation, £6,581 were expended, but this amount included the repairs to bottom due to an accident, and is taken account of in the before-mentioned £10,586.

While dealing with the financial question, it may be stated that in June, 1909, when she last left the United Kingdom (she had been trading abroad ever since), her value was given at about £25,000. When she left Smyrna on the voyage which formed the subject of this investigation, her owners estimated that her market value was about £22,000 or £23,000; and her value in the Company’s books at that time was £21,500.

Her hull and machinery were insured for the agreed figure of £25,000 on twelve months’ policies from the 28th of February, 1911, the premium being £5 10s. per cent. The freight was insured for £2,050, its value being £2,640; and there was a policy for £1,200 on premiums, reducing £100 per month. There were no provisions or disbursements; and the owners took the risk of small damage.

The vessel was overhauled in dry dock at New York in June 1913, and again in November and December, 1911, she was at Smyrna, where she was to load a cargo of grain for the United Kingdom under the terms of a charter-party entered into for the owners and Messrs. C. Variparti, of Great St. Helen’s, London, dated the 13th of November, 1911.

It may be remarked that she had previously carried grain cargoes. Once from St. Petersburg to London, in August, 1900, and upon another occasion from Odessa to Hamburg, in March, 1902. In the first-mentioned instance, she was loaded in accordance with the Board of Trade Regulations, and in the second instance, according to “special plan.”

The master who was in her at the time of the present casualty had previously carried a cargo of grain in the ship during his tenure of the command.

Having completed her lading, the “Hugheiden” left London on the 28th of November, and arrived at 2 a.m. of the 6th of December, bound for Dublin, with a cargo consisting of 20,692 quarters (equalling 4,764 tons) of barley, all of which was shipped in the same cargo in 1,877 bags; manned by a crew of 27 hands, all told; and under the command of Mr. J. Barkess, who held a certificate of competency as master, numbered 0023, whose name had been on the ship’s register since the 18th of February, 1909.

According to the certificate signed by the master at Smyrna before leaving, her draught of water was 21 feet 6 inches forward and 22 feet aft, the mean draught being 21 feet 9 inches.

In due course the pilot left the ship off Pelican’s Spit, and she proceeded on her voyage.

On the 12th of December she put into Bona for coal, of which she was in danger of running short owing to the prevalence of a strong head wind, and there took in 50 tons.

On the 14th of December she took in a further supply of 220 tons of coal at Algiers, and sailed thence for home on the same day.

It appears to have gone well until the 20th of December, when the weather came in bad, the wind being S.S.W. or S.W.

At 3 a.m. of the 21st of December, a light was seen bearing about four points on the starboard bow (the ship’s course is uncertain), which the second officer told the man at the wheel (one of the survivors) was Ushant.

It was blowing strong, there was a good sea on, and the wind was a little on the port quarter.

At 5.30 a.m., she was going very hard from the south-westward, there was a very heavy sea running, and water was flowing over the ship fore and aft.

At this time she, the deck of the fore end of the spring buffer connected with the starboard wheel carri-

aged away. The hand steering-gear was brought into requisition and the starboard chains of the steam steering-gear were connected up with shackles, and steam once more used, but in a short time the corres-

ponding connection with the port spring buffer broke.

The hand-gear was again shipped, two men being at the wheels (the hand-gear had a double wheel), and the wheel decreased to heave-to. However, while exe-

cuting this manoeuvre, a heavy sea struck the ship in the port quarter, causing the rudder to give a kick sufficient to break the port arm of the steering-gear.

It was found impossible to repair the entire length of the stem steering-gear, owing to the heavy seas, the starboard arm of the hand steering-gear also broke, the stern was temporarily trimmed, and the vessel wallowed in the trough of the sea.

Up to the time of the steering-gear breaking down there had been no perceptible list, but after the ship commenced to roll in the trough of the sea she listed to starboard, and about 8 a.m. was nearly on her beam ends.

The second officer, while trying to connect up the steam steering-gear, was washed under the quarter blocks and had one of his legs broken.

About 8 a.m. one of the ordinary seamen, name unknown, was washed overboard and drowned.

About 9.15 a.m. one of the German sailors was also washed overboard and lost.

The master, too, was washed from one side of the deck to the other, apparently receiving injury to his arm.

It seems that during the morning the barnings of the hatches had been examined.

Although the foretops were not being worked, steam was maintained, although not without much difficulty, owing to the way in which the ship was lying over.

The wheelhouse was stowed up, the cooking about knee-deep on the starboard side, but, apparently, this was only the usual amount of bilge water, plus something through the filling gurneys, the iron cover of which had not been put down, and through the doors.

About 11 a.m., the master gave orders to the crew to put their life-sets on and to prepare the life boats.
but upon going to them they were found to have been smashed by the sea.

It was, of course, impossible to make any attempt to lower the weather boats, but they were lost at sea, with the exception of their falls, the crew got into them and stood ashore. For the final plunge of the ship, the master being in the jolly-boat and the chief officer in charge of the lifeboat.

About noon the 'Hughenden' capsized. At the lower falls of the lifeboat were cut, but her gunwale appears to have been fouled by one of her davits, and she was capsized and her occupants thrown into the sea. A like fate seems to have befallen the jolly-boat.

The ship remained afloat in an inverted position for some time and then finally disappeared.

Previous to the capsizing of the 'Hughenden,' which was flying signals of distress, a steamship, subsequently ascertained to be the 'Devonsire,' of Glasgow, had been observed, and after the accident she steamed to the immediate vicinity of the disaster with a view to rendering assistance to any of the survivors, and succeeded in rescuing an able seaman, named John McNeil, and a fireman, named Alexander Brand. Both had been in the lifeboat and had succeeded in securing some line up the beach, by means of lines. The third officer of the 'Devonsire' very gallantly jumped overboard with a line and went to the assistance of McNeil, who was unable to use one of his arms and so could not hang on to a rope. The remainder of the 'Hughenden's crew lost their lives.

The two survivors, who were treated with every kindness, were conveyed to Lisbon by the 'Devonsire,' which landed, and subsequently sent home by His Majesty's Consul-General.

The following is a written statement by Mr. E. Hart master of the steamship 'Devonsire,' dated at Lisbon, the 28th of December, 1911:

"Report of the foundering of the s.s. 'Hughenden,' 21/12/11. Noon. Wind S.W., hurricane force. The stiffest and most violent squall, rain, hail, after deck full of wreckage of horse fittings and deck cargo, steering-gear smashed, steering with after hand steering-gear; sighted a steamer flying signals of distress. She was in the trough of the sea, on her afterboard beam ends, signalling; 'I am sinking.' We bore down upon her as close as we prudent with our defective steering-gear; she proved to be the s.s. 'Hughenden,' of Sunderland. A heavy squall came down, thick with rain, obscuring everything. When the sea cleared, found 'Hughenden' had capsized. We immediately steamed to leeward of her. She then foundered. No boat would have lived in the networking amongst the floating wreckage and managed to pick up two men, named Brandt and McNeil. The weather was thick and cold at the time, and we feared some of the others, too numb to hold on to the wreckage, let go their hold and drowned. We stood by till dark. On the loss of sails, however, but found no signs of Life, and then put our vessel head to wind and sea, hurricane still blowing.

"Position: Lat. 48° 15' N., Long. 7° 29' W.

"(Signed) E. HART.

"Master."

It is a chapter of singular coincidences that the "Devonsire," steam steering-gear should have been disabled at the time that she picked up the survivors of the 'Hughenden,' and that on the same date the steamship "Challengers I" (which also foundered) was in the same fix as shown by the officers of the "Challengers II," court which inquired into the circumstances of her loss.

The points now to be considered are:

(a) Whether the cargo of the 'Hughenden' was properly stowed and secured from shifting;

(b) Whether she was overloaded; and

(c) What was the cause of her capsizing.

There appears to have been a choice of three methods by which the larby might have been laden:

(d) That under the Eighteenth Schedule of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1911, the cargo was to be loaded in bulk on the lower holds, then it is obvious that the feeders must contain at least two per cent. of the compartments they feed, i.e., the 'tween decks, plus the lower hold.

(e) That the ship shall not be overloaded.

As I have already pointed out, the vessel was fully provided with shifting boards when she was first built, and the sum of £64 14s. 6d. was spent at Smyrna in making them complete and in providing the necessary stores, while a further sum of £13 10s. 3d. was expended upon labour, nails, &c. According to the deposition of Atanasios Rivas, carpenter, Smyrna, the thickness of the shores was 6 inches, thinning down to 4 inches; and there were 20 large ones and 8 small ones in each hold, i.e., 10 large ones and 4 small ones on each side.

John McNeil, A.B. (one of the survivors), stated that shifting boards were put up in all the holds fore and aft; that they were so close together it was not possible to pass through, so far as he could see; that new board-up supplies were sent up at Smyrna; that the shifting boards were shot up on each side; and that there was a truckway only in No. 3 hold.

A 2
As before stated, the vessel had sixteen trimming hatches in her between decks, distributed over her various compartments.

With regard to the provision of transomways or feeders in Nos. 3 and 4 holds, Lord Chief Justice Lush, the stedeover at Smyrna who loaded the cargo, in a deposition, dated the 3rd of March, 1912, stated that: "There was a transomway in the middle section of No. 3 hold. It was a square, with sides of three metres, made of wooden boards, 2½ inches thick, nailed together on edge only in No. 3 hold, and again: "The feeder made in the middle section of No. 3 hold was the only feeder throughout the ship." He also stated that all the transomways in the middle section of the ship were secured by a band to which they were secured, believed, but was not certain, that there were some athwartship bulkheads (pre-eminently in the between decks), said that the grain cargo was stowed right up to the beams, but did not reach above them; that the bags of grain, which were only placed in the fore part between decks, under the beams in the hold, (estimated by the shipper to equal about 170 tons), were stowed a-burton right up to the beams; that the quantity of bulk grain carried for the cargo, which was placed in the feeder, was just enough to fill the lower hold, and that the vessel herself was in excellent condition, with her cargo well stowed and all equipment complete.

Alexander Brandt (a fireman, and the other survivor) stated that there were transomways in Nos. 1 and 2 holds, but that he knew nothing about No. 4 hold. Thus, there is some conflict of evidence upon this point.

McNeill stated that the lower hatches were put on in the following way: Taking No. 3 hatchway, where, with out doubt, a transomway was constructed, some of the lower hatches would necessarily be on, but if all were in position, there would have been a noticeable absence of sense and utility in building a feeder down to them. It is noteworthy that No. 3 was the only compartment in the ship that contained a single shipment. Therefore, as regards No. 3 hold, I am satisfied that all the lower hatches were not on. If the lower hatches were not on in the other compartments where, according to both the stedeover and McNeill, there were no transomways to the lower holds, then there was a distinct contravention of sub-section (b) of Section 2 of the Regulations, but upon this point there was no evidence other than that of McNeill. There appear to have been two shipments in each compartment other than No. 3, and there was some bulk grain carried in the upper after peak tank. If it is correct that the feeder in No. 3 hold was the only one throughout the ship, then, even if all the other lower hatches were off, sub-section (c) of the Regulations was not complied with.

When the cargo was completed, the upper hatches were put on, covered over with three tarpaulins, and battened down.

It is informed that grain-laden vessels arriving in the United Kingdom are inspected with a view to determining whether they have been properly loaded, but I am of opinion that it would be preferable if they were inspected by competent authority at their loading ports.

After very careful consideration, I am of opinion that the "Hughenden" was not properly laden in accordance with the Regulations approved by the Board of Trade.

The next question is as to whether the vessel was overladden. According to the draught given by the master on leaving Smyrna, the ship had about half-an-inch of ballast left to spare, but, according to the weight of cargo and the amount of oil (130 tons) said to have been on board, it should have been, according to the displacement scale, about 2½ inches. Probably the difference was due to stowage, fresh water for the boilers, &c.

The owners estimated that there were 230 tons of coal on board when the ship left Smyrna. Working back I make the amount slightly more, but, allowing for head winds encountered before arriving at and during Egypt, 240 tons, or about possible short weight, I have accepted those figures.

The deadweight, therefore, upon leaving Algiers would be 4,904 tons, which, with an allowance of, say, 1½ tons for fresh water and stores, would give her a mean draught of 21 feet 10½ inches, or an over immersion of ¾ of an inch. However, at the time of the casualty she would have had four inches more than the required freeboard.

I now come to the cause of the capsizing, which may be divided under two heads:

(a) The machinery or steering-gear, which rendered the ship unmanageable; and

(b) The failure of the vessel into the trough of the sea, which made her roll heavily, and brought about the shifting of the cargo, which was very probably through some of the shores and shifting boards having given way.

In a protest signed by the survivors at Sundsvall on the 9th January, 1912, it is stated that: "The vessel lying at the mercy of the wind and sea listed heavily to starboard, and it was noticed that some of the hatches were open for the No. 3 hold. Huge seas continued to break on board, and the water getting among the cargo the vessel showed signs of sinking." However, as the inquiry both these men stated that they were unable to say whether or not any water found its way into the holds. McNeil said that he saw one of the corners of a tarpaulin on No. 3 hatch was adrift; on the other hand, Brandt said that he could see both Nos. 3 and 4 hatches, and that there was nothing the matter with them.

But for the disintegration of the steering-gear, it is probable that this casualty would not have occurred.

I have already mentioned that the third officer of the "Devonshire" jumped overboard with a line and rescued John McNeil. In the weather that prevailed— the severity of which is fully recognised in this Report—I consider the action of Mr. Thomas Watkins, the officer in question, to have been a very courageous one, and it affords me pleasure to draw his name to the notice of the Board of Trade for its favourable consideration. I may add that the owners of the "Devonshire" have intimated their intention of marking his appreciation of his services in some suitable manner.

Upon examination of the evidence, Mr. Burton, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for my opinion:—

1. What was the cost of the vessel to her owners? What had she to pay when she last left the ship Kingdom, and when she left Smyrna on the 6th December last? What insurances were effected upon and in connection with her?

2. When the vessel left Smyrna on the 6th of December last, was she loaded in accordance with the Board of Trade Regulations for the carriage of grain cargoes. If not, was she loaded in accordance with—

(a) The provisions of Schedule 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894; or

(b) The plan of loading approved by the Board of Trade on the 5th of November last?

3. At the time that the vessel sailed from Smyrna—

(a) Was she in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull and equipment?

(b) Had she the required freeboard and was she in good trim for a voyage to Dublin?

4. What bunkers coal was shipped on the vessel after she had left Smyrna? At what port or ports was it shipped, and when the vessel sailed from the last coaling port did she have the required freeboard, and was she in good trim for a voyage to Dublin?

5. What is the cause of the loss of the vessel?

6. What are the circumstances in which all hands, except 18, were lost? Mr. Middleton then addressed me on behalf of his clients, Mr. Burton replied, and I now return the following answers to the questions of the Board of Trade:—

1. The cost of the vessel to her owners, when new in 1900, was £15,300. When she last left the United Kingdom, on November 29th, the owners estimated her value at about £26,000; and when she left Smyrna they estimated that her market value was about £29,000, £32,000, while she stood in the Company's books at £38,000.

The insurances effected upon and in connection with her were hull and machinery, £2,000, annual premium of £5 10s. per cent.; freight, £2,600, its value being £2,600; and on premiums, £1,200, received £50 per month. There were no insurances on disbursements, and the owners took the risk of small damage.
2. When the vessel left Smyrna on the 6th December last, I am of opinion that she was not loaded in accordance with the Board of Trade Regulations for the carriage of grain cargoes.

Neither was she loaded in accordance with—
(a) The provisions of Schedule 18 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894; nor
(b) The plan of loading approved by the Board of Trade on the 8th of November, 1900.

3. At the time the vessel sailed from Smyrna—
(a) She was in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull and equipments.
(b) She had the required freeboard and was in good trim for a voyage to Dublin.

4. 270 tons of bunker coal were shipped on the vessel after she had left Smyrna, namely, 50 tons at Bone and 220 tons at Algiers. When the vessel sailed from the last coaling port she had about three-quarters of an inch less than the required freeboard, but in other respects she was in good trim for a voyage to Dublin. At the time of her loss she would have had about four inches more than the required freeboard.

5. The causes of the loss of the vessel were—That both the steam and hand steering-gear carried away during an abnormally heavy S.W. gale with a very high sea; that the ship, being unmanageable, fell off into the trough of the sea and rolled heavily; and that, in consequence of such rolling, her cargo of barley shifted, with the result that she attained a tremendous list to starboard and eventually capsized and foundered.

6. The circumstances in which all hands, except two, were drowned are, that when the ship capsized the boats in which the crew were seated on her bridge, waiting to be floated off when she went down, which boats it had been impossible to get out, also capsized, throwing their occupants into the water. The unfortunate men were provided with lifebelts, but they appear to have succumbed to the cold before they could be rescued by the "Devonshire."

Annexed is a list of those who lost their lives upon this sad occasion, with the relatives of whom I, and those associated with me on this Inquiry, desire to express deep sympathy.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
W. F. CARROLL,
Commander, R.M.R.,
Inspector.

May 11th, 1912.
The Assistant Secretary,
Marine Department,
Board of Trade,
Whitehall, S.W.

List of those persons who lost their lives through the capsizing and foundering of the steamer "Hughenden."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Ruckless</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Roseworthy</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1st Mate</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Boardman</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2nd Mate</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Oldham</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Bawd</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Theobal</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Sandberg</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Dixon</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Boarman</td>
<td>Finnish</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. McLellan</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>A.B.</td>
<td>British</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leander Bjork</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sailor</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georges Fontaine</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>French</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Schoel</td>
<td>27</td>
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