

(No. 7591.)

## "VERONESE" (S.S.).

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at Liverpool on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 31st March, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th April, before STUART DEACON, Esq., Stipendiary Magistrate, assisted by Rear Admiral ERNEST FLEET, Commander L. W. BAYLDON, R.N.R., and Lieutenant C. J. BENTON, R.N.R., into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steamship "VERONESE," near Leixoes, Portugal, whereby loss of life ensued.

*Report of Court.*

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the cause of the stranding and the subsequent total loss of the ship on the rocks off Boa Nova, from two to four miles north of Leixoes, on the coast of Portugal, was due to the master when, at 3 a.m., he had failed to pick up either the Douro or Leixoes Light, notwithstanding the fact that he had been heading in towards the land for about 20 minutes after the time when, as he told the Court, he expected to see the Douro Light, not then and thereafter making use of the lead, the use of which would have undoubtedly shown him his dangerous proximity to the land.

The Court is satisfied that after the stranding of the vessel every effort was made, both by those on shore as well as on the vessel, to save the lives of the passengers and crew under exceptionally difficult circumstances. Special thanks are due in this respect to the Portuguese life-saving brigade, who were assisted by British residents and some of the officers and men from British ships in the vicinity.

As regards certain allegations which have been made with regard to the existence of want of discipline on the vessel after the stranding and also as to the pillaging of the first and second class passengers' luggage by some of the crew, the Court is of opinion that good discipline was, in fact, maintained by the master on the ship after the stranding, and that the allegations as to the pillaging have been greatly exaggerated, and have little more foundation than the fact that many of the crew and emigrants, finding themselves very insufficiently clad and unable to get back to their quarters to obtain their own clothes, did, under these necessitous circumstances, take various articles of clothing lying in the cabins of the first-class passengers, which were almost the only accessible and sheltered portions of the ship.

The Court, in spite of the suggestion made that the Douro and Leixoes Lights were not, in fact, lit, desires to say that, in its opinion, both the said lights, in fact, were lit, but were obscured from those on board the ship by a land haze and heavy squalls of rain.

The Court entirely acquits the chief officer of any blame whatever in respect of the casualty, and, as regards the captain, finds itself reluctantly compelled, in consequence of his above-mentioned negligence and default, to suspend his certificate for six months from this date.

The Court further takes this opportunity of expressing its sincere sympathy with all those who have lost relatives or friends in this lamentable disaster.

The Court further, before parting with this case, desires to place on record its appreciation of the courageous conduct in assisting and rescuing certain emigrant passengers who were isolated in the fore

part of the ship, shown by the chief officer, Mr. Ernest Victor Hugo, Frederick Martin, boatswain, William Jay, able seaman, and others of the crew.

Dated this 4th day of April, 1913.

STUART DEACON,  
Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

ERNEST FLEET,  
L. WOOD BAYLDON,  
CHARLES J. BENTON, } Assessors.*Annex to the Report.*

This Inquiry was held in the Magistrates' Room, Dale Street, in the City of Liverpool, on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 31st March, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th April, 1913. Mr. J. Paxton (Messrs. Avison, Morton, and Paxton) conducted the proceedings on behalf of the Board of Trade, Mr. John Cameron (Messrs. Cameron, Duguid, and Company) watched the proceedings on behalf of the owners of the "Veronese" (the Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Company, Limited), and Mr. L. S. Holmes (Messrs. Miller, Taylor, and Holmes) represented the master, Mr. Charles Turner, the chief officer, Mr. E. V. Hugo, who were parties to the Inquiry, and the third officer, Mr. T. J. Henderson. Mr. R. Stewart Brown appeared for Mrs. Sampson, a saloon passenger whose husband succumbed after being landed in the breeches buoy.

The "Veronese," Official Number 120912, was a British single-screw steamship, built of steel at Belfast in 1906 by Messrs. Workman, Clark, and Company, Limited, and registered at the Port of Liverpool. She had three decks, including the boat deck, was clincher built, with an elliptical stern, two masts, and was schooner-rigged. Her length was 465 feet, breadth 59 feet, and depth in hold from tonnage deck to ceiling, at midships, 29 feet. Her gross tonnage was 7,877.43 tons, and registered tonnage, 5,078.24 tons. She had six bulkheads and eight water-ballast tanks with a capacity of 1,500 tons. She was fitted with one set of inverted direct-acting triple-expansion condensing engines of 660 nominal, and 300 indicated, horse-power, designed to give her a speed of 11½ knots per hour, and was furnished with three steel double-ended main boilers, and one single-ended steel donkey boiler, with a working pressure, when loaded, of 200 lbs. Both the engines and boilers were constructed by Messrs. Workman, Clark, and Company, Limited, at Belfast, in 1906. She had one main engine pump and three other auxiliary pumps in the engine room, and two hand Downton pumps on deck. She was steered by steam, and carried 14 lifeboats (10 wood and 4 steel) of the aggregate capacity of 6,477 cubic feet and capable of accommodating 642 persons. They were fitted with copper tanks. She had 330 British lifebelts and 18 lifebuoys, and, in addition to the above, 330 American lifebelts in excess of requirements. She also carried 24 explosive signals, two deck flares, 24 rockets, 24 blue lights, and 18 lifebuoy lights. She had on board two deep-sea leads and four hand leads, with lines complete; also Lord Kelvin's sounding machine and gear attached; one Walker's Cherub patent taffrail log; and a Lyle brass gun, for throwing a light line on shore for a distance of 1,500 feet, with gear complete. The ship carried four compasses, one of which, on the upper bridge, was a Thompson's standard. The ship was supplied with the necessary charts and sailing directions. The chart in use by the master at the time of the accident was the large-scale Admiralty chart, No. 87, Spain and Portugal, West Coast, corrected up to 1911.

Considerable structural alterations were carried out on the "Veronese," between September and December last, to provide additional passenger accommodation, including a deck house on each side of the fore deck, with three entrances down to the third-class passenger accommodation. A new upper bridge was built in Liverpool shortly before sailing on January 12th, 1913. No vertical plan of the ship was produced in Court.

The standard compass was shifted two feet further aft, during alterations.

The ship stood in the Company's books at the value of £117,550, and was insured for £105,000 against total loss. The "Veronese" passenger certificate, dated the 7th January, 1913, was in force until the 12th December, 1913, and permitted her to carry 68 first-class passengers, 46 second-class passengers, 104 third-class passengers, and a crew of 98, making a total of 316 persons.

Lastly, she was owned by the Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Company, Limited, Mr. George Henry Melly, of the Royal Liver Buildings, Liverpool, being designated the person to whom the management of the vessel was entrusted by and on behalf of the owners, by advice received the 27th November, 1908, under the seal of the Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Company, Limited.

The "Veronese" left Liverpool on January 12th, 1913, bound for Vigo, under the command of Mr. Charles Turner, who held a certificate of competency as ordinary master, No. 028990. She had 5,000 tons of general cargo on board, and carried a crew of 92 hands, and 20 passengers. Previous to the pilot leaving off Point Lynas, the standard compass was adjusted for deviation, this being necessary owing to a new flying bridge being erected just before sailing.

The vessel arrived at Vigo on January 15th at 5 p.m., where about 25 tons of cargo was shipped, also 117 passengers embarked, and five additional members of the crew signed on. This made a total of 97 hands for the crew and 137 passengers, this latter number being well within the limit of the passenger certificate's requirements.

Proceeding to sea from Vigo at 9 p.m. of the 15th January, drawing 23 feet 7 inches aft, she sailed for Port Leixoes, which is a small harbour to the northward of the Douro River. About 10 p.m. the vessel was abeam of Cape Silleiro Light, which was rounded at a distance of between two or three miles, but no four-point bearing was taken. A departure was taken from this assumed position and a course was set S. 30° W. by standard compass, corresponding with a S. 30° W. (magnetic) course, as the master laid down on the chart, there being no deviation on S.W. courses. The patent log was also set at zero. The vessel proceeded at full speed, which the master estimated would take the ship over the ground, about 10-3 knots per hour, under the existing weather conditions.

The night being dark and clear, with a fresh south-westerly wind and rough sea, this course, if made good, would take the vessel considerably off the land as she proceeded to the southward, and, if having run her distance correctly, the master assumed the vessel would arrive at a position about 20 miles to the north-west of Port Leixoes at 2.40 a.m. of the 16th; and he intended to then steam in towards Port Leixoes, with the object of picking up Oporto Light, and eventually going into harbour at daylight, which would be about 7 a.m.

Continuing on the S. 30° W. course, the weather being clear, a four-point bearing of Mount Dor Light was taken, which is a light 21 miles to the southward of Cape Silleiro, and when abeam at 0.15 a.m. of the 16th, placed the vessel six miles off. The patent log showed 25 miles, and this bearing on the chart showed that the vessel had been set in about two miles in the two hours. The light of Vianna, five miles to the southward, were also clearly visible, but no cross bearings were taken. A fresh departure was taken from the position off Mount Dor, but as the course was taking the vessel well off the land, it was not altered. At 2.40 a.m. of the 16th January, the weather had become more boisterous, with passing rain squalls, and the Mount Dor Light became obscured in consequence. The master now considered that he had run his distance by calculation, and the patent log also showing 52 miles, and allowing for a further set in of two miles, the vessel was headed towards the land on a S.E. compass course (which was known to be magnetic) with the ultimate object of picking up the Oporto Light and, subsequently, Port Leixoes Light.

At 3 a.m., had the weather been clear, it would have been apparent that the vessel was manoeuvring within the range of both Mount Dor and Oporto

Lights, which intersect near this position, and might reasonably have been visible.

At midnight, the second officer, Mr. E. R. Williams, who holds a master's certificate, relieved Mr. T. J. Henderson, the 3rd officer, who gave him the compass course as S. 30° W. westerly. He stated that at 0.15 a.m. Mount Dor Light was abeam, distant six miles, the patent log showing 25 miles. This agreed with the master's evidence. At about 1 a.m. Mount Dor Light became obscured by heavy rain squalls, and the second officer accordingly blew down the speaking tube into the chart room and called the master, who immediately came on deck and had the steam whistle blown for a short time till the weather cleared. On going below, he again gave verbal instructions to the second officer to be called at 2.30 a.m., or before, should the weather become thick.

The weather continued fairly clear, so the master was duly called at 2.30 a.m., and on his coming on deck at 2.40 a.m. the patent log showed 52 miles. He altered the course to S. E. by standard compass, which was magnetic, and the vessel was kept at full speed in anticipation of picking up the Oporto Light at any moment.

At 3 a.m. the vessel was well within the range of Oporto Light, assuming her to have made the courses and distances intended. At 3.55 a.m. the master, not having sighted Oporto Light as he had expected, anticipated that he might be over-running his port, and he at once gave the order to hard-a-port, and by 4 a.m. the vessel was steadied on a N.W. westerly course, and the engine room telegraph was rung "Slow ahead."

The chief officer, Mr. E. V. Hugo, who holds a master's certificate, relieved the second officer at 4 a.m., who gave him the compass course as N.W. westerly, and the speed as slow ahead; he also reported two masthead lights of passing steamers some distance off, one being on the port bow, and the other on the starboard beam, these being the only lights visible at this time. The weather, according to the chief officer's evidence, was blowing fresh from the S.W., with a rough sea and a low-lying haze towards the land. The master up to this time did not realise this condition of the weather over the land, and stated that, as vessels had passed in-shore of him, he felt justified in heading his vessel into the land at 5 a.m. on a S.E. compass course (magnetic), expecting to be about 11 miles off Port Leixoes, and did not think of taking any soundings as he considered the chart was on too small a scale to give him any warning of danger, but in the light of subsequent events he admitted that by so doing it might have averted the disaster. It may be mentioned here that he was on the point of giving the order hard-a-port, with the intention of heading out to sea, almost immediately before the vessel struck. About 5.25 a.m. the master observed what he took to be broken water on the port bow. He immediately ordered the helm to "hard-a-port" and the engines to "full speed astern," but before these orders could be carried out, the vessel struck the rocks heavily two or three times and remained fast. It may be also mentioned that the chart used was the only document recovered from the wreck. All the logs, books, &c., were lost in the vessel, which made it somewhat difficult for the Court to reconcile the actual facts with the evidence obtainable from the various witnesses.

The particular Admiralty chart, by which the master navigated the vessel, was produced in Court, and is on the largest scale obtainable, and although the soundings shown are irregular, they show a considerable decrease in depth when approaching the land from the assumed position of the vessel at 3 a.m., and would have given ample warning of the dangerous proximity of the land.

A few minutes after grounding, on a spot which eventually proved to be 350 yards from the shore, near Boa Nova, from 2 to 4 miles to the northward of Port Leixoes, the fires in the main boilers were extinguished, and the engine room and stokehold were abandoned on account of the water in the ship. The second engineer, who was on watch, saw that no one had been left below. The heavy seas breaking with great violence over the fore part of the vessel, stove in the hatches forward and immense volumes of water poured below, flooding the emigrants' quarters, the vessel resting on the rocks with a strong list to starboard, and heading S. 46° E. (magnetic) towards the shore. Very shortly, with loss of steam, the electric

lighting gave out, the ship being plunged into darkness, with the exception of the alleyways, in which an oil lamp on either side had been burning. Rockets were sent up and signals of distress were made and wireless calls for assistance sent out and continued by the operator, Lawrence Smith, until the emergency batteries gave out after four hours, though estimated to run for 12 hours. These calls were eventually effectual in bringing to the vicinity the German steamer "Hollandia" and the Ellerman Line steamer "Vauban," both of which stood by for some considerable time, but seeing that no assistance could be rendered from seaward, they proceeded on their voyages.

After the wireless had given out, Smith, the operator, who had been working incessantly at his instruments, gave much assistance in morsing to the workers ashore.

Meanwhile, on striking, the master had ordered the mate to call all hands and passengers, and to get the port midship lifeboats swung out and lowered to the rail, and several first-class passengers and others were put or got into them, but as it was considered most dangerous, and practically useless, to attempt to lower them, they were kept fast, some of the passengers remaining in them, whilst others took shelter as best they could on the port side of the vessel.

Before daylight lights appeared on shore, and forms could be seen and voices heard from people assembling to assist in saving life. As time wore on, rocket and life-saving parties arrived with their apparatus and attempts to establish communication by line with the "Veronese" commenced, and were continued without intermission, but without success until 6.30 p.m. or 7 p.m. on the evening of that day. At that time success crowned their unceasing efforts, and actual life saving commenced. During the day very little food of any sort was available, the store rooms on the starboard and exposed side being inaccessible, and a few biscuits, some taken from the boats, were practically the only food obtainable.

The vessel had on board a Lyle gun for throwing lines, but these latter had been washed away, and the ammunition or cartridges kept in a copper magazine in the wheel house were damaged by water, the wheel house being gutted by heavy seas, but fortunately, not before the rockets and distress signals had been removed from it. Lifejackets had either been served out or instructions had been given where they were to be found, but as lifesaving was at first carried out by the shore line and breeches buoy it was impracticable for them to be worn in transit to the shore. During the first night, the 16th January, about 22 people in all were drawn on shore, this work continuing until the line parted. The line had been made fast to the funnel of the ship, the shore end resting on a low tripod above the beach. This line, not being taut through fear of its parting, caused the breeches buoy, during its passage, to dip and be dragged through the surf, and through this, several lives were lost, but how many it was impossible to say, as from the evidence of witnesses on board, signals from the shore to the effect that the occupants had respectively arrived in safety were in every instance made, though owing to the wind and spray it is possible that the messages may have been, in some cases, misunderstood.

The evidence of Mrs. Sampson, widow of Mr. Henry Sampson, a first-class passenger, illustrates forcibly the risks run in being hauled on shore. This lady, whose husband died from shock and exhaustion after being dragged to shore in the breeches buoy, stated that she took charge of Alexander Turnbull, a child of 5 years of age and son of a first-class passenger who was saved. They were both put into the breeches buoy, and as they were in transit, the slacking line allowed the buoy to dip and go under. The lady told the child to keep his mouth closed, but heard him gurgling, and caught hold of his clothes. She then became unconscious and was brought to shore without the child. Her sister, Miss Stone, took charge of another Turnbull child, a girl of 10 months old. The former reached the shore, and the child was washed out of the breeches buoy, but marvellous to relate, was picked up on the shore alive by a coast guard. Anabel Turnbull, aged 6 years, sister of the above-

mentioned children, and Mrs. Hawkins with her daughter, aged 6 years, were also washed out of the breeches buoy, and lost their lives. Others marked in the list as missing and supposed drowned, must, it may be presumed, have lost their lives in the same manner, but as rescue work by the breeches buoy was continued by night as well as by day it is impossible to verify the exact number who were drowned. The captain of the "Veronese" stated that it was quite possible that some of the male passengers or emigrants who were missing may have been Monarchists and political refugees from Portugal who, having reached the shore, had gone into hiding.

The dead bodies of one man, three women, and a girl were seen by the chief officer on the emigrant deck. These unfortunate people had met their death by drowning (the emigrant deck being flooded) or by wounds from wreckage. One emigrant woman from the structure on the port side forward covering the ladder way to the emigrants' deck, and containing the lavatories to which most of them had gone for shelter, was being assisted, much against her will, to a place of safety amidships by the chief officer. She hesitated, and losing her opportunity, was, together with the chief officer, struck by a heavy sea, torn from the latter's grasp, and washed overboard.

It was not until Friday, the 17th January, at 11 a.m., that the last of the terror-stricken emigrants were rescued from their exposed and dangerous position, and installed in comparative safety amidships, and this was due to the gallant conduct and untiring efforts of Mr. E. V. Hugo, the chief officer, ably assisted by Fred Martin, boatswain, William Jay, A.B., and others of the crew.

This work on the part of the rescuers entailed great danger to life and limbs, the fore part of the vessel with its list to the exposed side, being constantly swept by heavy seas, and Mr. Hugo was so severely injured during his courageous efforts that he was unable to sit upright whilst giving evidence some ten weeks after the event. The work was made more difficult by the fear and reluctance of the emigrants to cross the exposed part of the deck between the companion ladder forward and the sheltered spots amidships. One woman was found on the emigrant deck pinned down by a mass of wreckage, and was rescued from her perilous position by the chief officer.

On the line parting again on the 16th, communication was not again established until the evening of the following day, notwithstanding the continuous efforts of those on shore to do so. These latter consisted of members of the Portuguese life-saving brigade, ably assisted by some officers and men from British ships in the vicinity, and various English residents from the neighbourhood.

On Friday, the 17th January, the weather had slightly moderated, and some stewards stripping off their clothes managed to get at the cool chamber of the refrigerator and obtain therefrom some fruit, eggs, &c., which were served out generally, and provisions in small quantities were from time to time put into and hauled off by the breeches buoy from the shore.

During the rescue work on shore the tripod supporting the connecting line with the ship had, on the suggestion of the British Consul, who was present, been heightened, to reduce the peril in transit by the breeches buoy from the ship to the shore, but it is doubtful whether this alteration was of much effect.

The master was on deck for practically the whole of the time after stranding, directing the work of rescue by the breeches buoy. By this means about 89 in all were saved. On Saturday forenoon the weather had sufficiently moderated to enable two lifeboats from Oporto, attended by two tugs, to approach the ship, and the remainder of the crew and passengers, jumping or lowering themselves into the sea and aided by lifejackets and ropes were hauled into the boats, and taken on shore, 109 being rescued in this manner.

The captain was the last to leave, and having satisfied himself that no living creature remained on board, he, at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, the 18th January, got into the breeches buoy and was safely hauled to land. As to the eventual fate of the wrecked vessel, from which, later, a small quantity

of passengers' baggage was salvaged, a telegram was read out by counsel for the owners whilst the Court was sitting on the 31st March, to the effect that the steamship "Veronese" had broken in two, and that the fore part and bow had completely disappeared.

The discipline appears to have been good during the whole of this trying time, and the opinion of the Court as to the charges of pilfering baggage, &c., made by a few passengers, is clearly expressed in its answer to the Board of Trade question No. 16 annexed.

A list of the members of the crew and of the passengers lost and missing by drowning or supposed drowning is attached.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Paxton, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:—

1. Was the vessel supplied with sufficient boats? Were they in good condition and properly equipped?
2. Was the vessel supplied with proper distress signals, sounding and life-saving appliances, and were they in good condition?
3. What were the appliances for lighting on the vessel? Were they adequate?
4. What number of compasses had the vessel, were they in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel, and when and by whom were they last adjusted?
5. Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time, were the errors correctly ascertained and the proper corrections to the courses applied?
6. Were proper measures taken at or about 10.15 p.m. on the 15th January last, to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel? Was a safe and proper course thereafter steered, and was due and proper allowance made for wind, tide, and currents?
7. Were safe and proper alterations made in the course, and were proper measures taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at or about 2.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and from time to time thereafter?
8. What were the courses set and steered after 2.40 a.m., and were they safe and proper courses, having regard to all the circumstances?
9. Were the red and white lights at Port Leixoes burning between 3.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and the time of the stranding?
10. Were the flash and fixed lights at Oporto burning between 3.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and the time of the stranding?
11. Was a good and proper look-out kept?
12. Were soundings taken after 2.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and if not, should soundings have been taken?
13. What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel? Was she seriously damaged thereby?
14. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?
15. How many of the passengers and crew of the vessel respectively lost their lives? What were the circumstances in which this occurred? Was every possible effort made by those on board to save life?
16. Was proper discipline maintained on board after the vessel stranded?
17. Was the stranding of, and/or serious damage to the "Veronese," and/or the loss of life caused by the wrongful act or default of the master and chief officer, or either of them?

Mr. Holmes having addressed the Court on behalf of the master and chief officer, the Court gave judgment as above and returned the following answers to the questions of the Board of Trade:—

1. The vessel was supplied with sufficient boats. They were in good condition and properly equipped.
  2. The vessel was supplied with proper distress signals, sounding and life-saving appliances, and they were in good condition.
- She also carried, in excess of the Board of Trade requirements, a Lyle gun for firing lines to the shore, two lines for the same, and the requisite ammunition.

She also had 330 approved American life-jackets, in addition to the same number of British made jackets.

3. The vessel was adequately lighted by electricity throughout. The alternative arrangements for oil lamps in case of the failure of the electric lighting, both as to positions and numbers, were satisfactory.

4. The vessel had four compasses, two on the bridge, including a Thompson's standard, by which the courses were set and steered, one in the wheel house under the bridge and one for the hand gear aft. They were in good order and condition, the standard compass being last adjusted off Lynas Point on January 12th, 1913, by J. Parkes, compass adjuster, of Liverpool. Compass observations were taken during the passage to Vigo from time to time on south-westerly courses, the results agreeing with the deviation card supplied.

5. The master ascertained the deviations of his compasses from time to time as opportunity offered, but owing to the heavy rolling of the vessel, and as they did not materially differ from those of the deviation card, he decided to use the latter.

The proper corrections to the courses were applied.

6. Proper measures were taken at or about 10.15 p.m. on the 15th January last, to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel.

A safe and proper course was steered until 2.40 a.m. and up to that time, in the light of subsequent events, the vessel was in a perfectly safe position, and proper allowance was made for wind, tide, and currents.

7. At or about 2.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, safe and proper alterations of the course were made and steered with a view to picking up the Douro Light, but the master, when, at 3 a.m., he found himself well within range of the Douro Light and still unable to pick up the same, ought to have had recourse to the use of the lead, and not having done so, he cannot be considered to have thereafter steered a course which could be considered safe or proper. This is more to be observed as it is evident that the weather was far from clear.

8. The course steered from 2.40 a.m. up to 3.55 a.m. was S.E. (magnetic), and there is a considerable conflict of evidence as to what the courses thereafter actually were, but assuming that the courses, as stated by the captain, were the actual courses steered, the Court is of opinion that for the reasons given in the preceding answer, they were not, after 3 a.m., safe or proper courses to be steered, except only when the vessel was heading away from the land.

9. The Court believes that both the red and white lights at Port Leixoes were burning between 3.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and the time of the stranding of the vessel, but were obscured from those on board the vessel by the land haze and passing squalls of rain.

10. The Court also believes that the flash and fixed lights at Oporto were burning between the same times as mentioned in the last preceding answer, but were obscured from those on board the vessel by the same causes as before mentioned.

11. A good and proper look-out appears to have been kept from the bridge, but in the absence from the Inquiry of the look-out man, who was in the crow's nest between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. and at the time of the disaster, the Court is unable to say whether the look-out from the crow's nest was in fact good and proper or not.

12. Soundings were not taken after 2.40 a.m. on the 16th January last, and they should have been.

13. The cause of the stranding of the vessel was the standing-in of the vessel towards the land from time to time from an unverified position, after 3 a.m., when neither the Douro nor the Leixoes Light had been picked up, and no soundings had been taken.

The vessel was seriously damaged by the stranding, and became a total loss.

14. The vessel was not navigated by the captain with proper and seamanlike care, having regard to the facts before mentioned.

15. Twenty-seven of the passengers and crew are reported missing, of some of whom it is impossible to

say whether they are alive or dead. The following is a list of the 27 persons in question:—

Name.	Age.	Description.	Cause of Death.
J. Percival ...	49	A.B. ...	Supposed drowned.
Joseph Murphy...	49	Fireman ...	Drowned.
James McCann ...	32	Do. ...	Supposed drowned.
Florence Stubel...	33	Stewardess ...	Drowned in breeches buoy.
Frederick Caine...	29	Sailor ...	Supposed drowned.
Anabel Turnbull..	6	Passenger ...	Drowned in breeches buoy.
Alexander Turnbull.	4	Do. ...	Do.
T. H. Sampson ...	50	Do. ...	Died on shore from shock and exhaustion.
Eliza Hawkins ...	32	Do. ...	Drowned in breeches buoy.
Ada Hawkins ...	6	Do. ...	Do.
Mannel del Rio ...	45	Waiter ...	Supposed drowned.
Lucia Varela ...	16	2nd Class Passenger.	Do.
Luz Varela ...	14	Do. ...	Do.
Sev. Atares ...	—	3rd Class Passenger.	Do.
Manoel Gonzalez..	—	Do. ...	Do.
Angela del Elm Lancesas.	—	Do. ...	Do.
Beatriz Alvarez...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Maria Alvarez ...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Ant. Martinez Marino.	—	Do. ...	Do.
Pastora Outomeen	—	Do. ...	Do.
Jose Olivares ...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Haraclio Olivares	—	Do. ...	Do.
Antonio Sensa ...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Basilio Alvarez ...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Zenaro Quintas ...	—	Do. ...	Do.
Estrella Pasquez	—	Do. ...	Do.
Feliciano Gonzalez Diaz.	—	Do. ...	Do.

The circumstances under which the loss of life occurred were that Mr. Sampson died from shock some time after being landed in the breeches buoy.

Mrs. Hawkins, Ada Hawkins, Anabel Turnbull, Alexander Turnbull, and Florence Stubel, were either washed out of or drowned in the breeches buoy, and the remainder appeared to have been either drowned or killed in the vessel or washed overboard.

The Court is satisfied that every possible effort was, under the circumstances, made by those on board to save life.

16. The Court is of opinion that good discipline was maintained by the master on the ship after the stranding, and that the allegations as to the pillaging have been greatly exaggerated and have little more foundation than the fact that many of the crew and emigrants, finding themselves very insufficiently clad and unable to get back to their quarters to obtain their own clothes, did, under these necessitous circumstances, take various articles of clothing lying in the cabins of the first-class passengers, which were almost the only accessible and sheltered portions of the ship.

17. The stranding and subsequent serious damage to the "Veronese" and consequent loss of life which ensued was caused by the negligence and default of the master in the above-mentioned circumstances.

The Court entirely acquits the chief officer of any responsibility whatsoever for the casualty.

On the application of the master, the Court agreed to recommend the Board of Trade to grant him a mate's certificate during the time of the suspension of his certificate as master.

STUART DEACON,  
Judge.

We concur in the above Report,

ERNEST FLEET,  
L. WOOD BAYLDON,  
CHARLES J. BENTON, } Assessors.

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 6th day of May, 1913.)