The master seems, according to the evidence, to have left the deck at 7:15 p.m., and there is no record of his returning until after the casualty.

The last course given by the master was N. 45° E., which, if continued for one and a half hours, would have put the vessel abeam, and he verbally instructed the chief officer, who took over charge from him, to keep a good distance off the land.

It was stated that the course was changed at 7:15 p.m. to E.N.E., but neither of the log-books are definite on this point.

At 8 p.m. the chief officer went below, and was succeeded by the third officer, J. B. Lotte, who has held a second mate's certificate for a period of seven months, and he received verbal orders from the chief officer to keep the vessel a good distance off the land, and the course was changed to E.N.E. by compass.

During the period of his watch, the course was altered several times, but the evidence of the helmsman and the officer are in conflict as to the extent of the alterations.

At midnight, however, the course was given to the second officer, on his assuming the watch, as E.N.E.

Seven minutes afterwards the vessel struck, and remained aground for two and a half hours, bouncing heavily. She then came off, leaking badly, and returned to Durban. She has since been on the floating dock, and has been temporarily repaired, but the injuries have been so extensive that it will be necessary for the vessel to be sent to England for permanent repairs.

From the evidence adduced, it was evident that, from the moment the master assumed control from the pilot, no steps were adopted to ascertain the position of the vessel, by taking cross bearings of lights for a departure, nor was any attempt made to verify the correctness of the compass, or to take the time of the dip of the lead, and its bearings.

No course was laid down on the chart, nor were any instructions given to either of the ship's officers, either verbally or otherwise, as to how far the ship was to run by the log before changing the course, nor were any instructions given as to what the course was to be changed to from time to time.

None of the officers were made familiar with the contour or trend of the coast, nor were they warned of the dangers existing, in the shape of such dangerous shoals as the Glennot Reef and the Tenedos Shoal, which they would necessarily pass during the night.

The third officer, with his short experience, was left from 8 to 10 p.m. in charge of the navigation of the vessel, with no knowledge of the coast or the charts appertaining thereto. He was not instructed when to call the master, or informed of the dangers he was likely to meet, the courses being left entirely at his discretion.

Only two able seamen were on deck, one at the wheel and the other at the look-out. The fact that one of these men was to leave an important post, if any essential duty about the decks had to be carried out.

It is on record, and it is regrettable, that the man on the look-out left his post to call the watch below just at the time when, if he had remained at his post, he would most probably have observed the breakers in time to have warned the officer on the watch of the danger.

The records of a former voyage were on board, and from these the master could haveascertained the course by which the vessel had then been navigating in safety past the points of danger, but these were not available.

Lord Kelvin's patent lead was on board, but no use was made of it—probably because the number of hands on deck during the watch were not sufficient.

At midnight, the ship had, so far as can be ascertained, run 66 miles from Durban.

The assessors have taken the courses and distances as they appear in the log-book, and as sworn to by the witnesses, and, after laying them off on the Admiralty chart, it is found that these courses place the ship where she struck, viz., either on the Glennot Reef or the Tenedos Shoal.

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From the evidence adduced, it was evident that, from the moment the master assumed control from the pilot, no steps were adopted to ascertain the position of the vessel, by taking cross bearings of lights for a departure, nor was any attempt made to verify the correctness of the compass, or to take the time of the dip of the lead, and its bearings.

No course was laid down on the chart, nor were any instructions given to either of the ship's officers, either verbally or otherwise, as to how far the ship was to run by the log before changing the course, nor were any instructions given as to what the course was to be changed to from time to time.

None of the officers were made familiar with the contour or trend of the coast, nor were they warned of the dangers existing, in the shape of such dangerous shoals as the Glennot Reef and the Tenedos Shoal, which they would necessarily pass during the night.

The third officer, with his short experience, was left from 8 to 10 p.m. in charge of the navigation of the vessel, with no knowledge of the coast or the charts appertaining thereto. He was not instructed when to call the master, or informed of the dangers he was likely to meet, the courses being left entirely at his discretion.

Only two able seamen were on deck, one at the wheel and the other at the look-out. The fact that one of these men was to leave an important post, if any essential duty about the decks had to be carried out.

It is on record, and it is regrettable, that the man on the look-out left his post to call the watch below just at the time when, if he had remained at his post, he would most probably have observed the breakers in time to have warned the officer on the watch of the danger.

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The assessors have taken the courses and distances as they appear in the log-book, and as sworn to by the witnesses, and, after laying them off on the Admiralty chart, it is found that these courses place the ship where she struck, viz., either on the Glennot Reef or the Tenedos Shoal.
It is a most extraordinary fact that the navigation of the vessel, after the master left the deck, should have been conducted under such conditions, that the safety of the vessel and of her passengers were practically entirely dependent upon the eyesight of the officer of the watch for the time being, and this at night. The absence of a night order-book is only one more instance of the laxity which seems to have prevailed.

The Court finds that L. H. Mann, the master of the steamerhip "Umsings," during the voyage from Durban up to the stranding of the said vessel "Umsings" on or near the Glenton Reef or the Tweedies Shoal on the night of the 31st March, 1905, was guilty of misconduct in having navigated his vessel in a careless and unseamanlike manner, without taking the necessary precautions, in consequence whereof the said vessel stranded, as above stated, and suffered considerable damage, the lives of the passengers on board, also, being seriously endangered. The Court therefore suspends his master's certificate for a period of six (6) calendar months, from the date of the casualty.

With regard to D. H. Lewis, the chief officer, the Court finds that, during a portion of his watch, which, however, ended at 8 p.m., the course steered having been towards the land, he should have taken bearings of available lights, and should have fixed the vessel's position on the chart at 8 p.m., or should have reported the course, distance, and bearings of lights to the master. He should also have conveyed to the third officer a more safe outside course, having regard to the third officer's inferior position, and inexperience. The chief officer is cautioned against displaying a similar want of diligence or care, but his certificate will not be dealt with in any way.

With regard to the charges against T. R. Lots, the third officer, this officer, on taking charge of the bridge, should, by enquiry and by consulting the charts and navigation books available to him, have made himself more conversant with the coast, its trend and existing dangers, and he should not have been satisfied with the instructions merely to keep the vessel a safe distance off the land. He also would have acted with greater prudence and seamanlike care and skill had he conveyed to the master, from time to time during the watch, the course the vessel was steering, and the distance run according to the log, especially when the ship's head was altered by him to N.E. by K. 1° E., and N.E. by E. 1° E., by compass, and when the land became invisible.

The records of the courses steered, and other data connected with the conduct of the vessel, during the watch, are entered in a scrap log in a manner which reflects carelessness, and want of method.

Having regard to all the circumstances, however, the third officer's certificate will not be dealt with, and will be returned to him.

Percy Binks,
President.

Charles Reeves, Assessor.

W. Brown Dickie,
Assessor.

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 6th day of July, 1906.)

FINDING

Victor
1906
with
Korea
East

We fix the number of crew of the vessel "Umsings" about 8. We find the vessel "Umsings" to have the tonnage of 550 tons. The vessel "Umsings" was a brick ship. The vessel "Umsings" was racing to the port of Durban, and the vessel "Umsings" was under the control of an experienced master.

The order of the Court is that the vessel "Umsings" be ordered to the port of Durban, and that the master of the vessel "Umsings" be ordered to make the necessary repairs to the vessel "Umsings".

1906.