

(No. 528.)

"PROMETHEUS," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Assize Court, Moot Hall, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, on the 17th and 18th of February 1880, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by J. R. RAVENHILL, Esquire, C.E., Captain FORSTER, and Captain CASTLE, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the supposed loss of the steamship "PROMETHEUS," of Sunderland, whilst on a voyage from Cardiff to Genoa.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,—

1. That the loss of the said steamship was in all probability due to the officer in charge thereof having held on for too long a time on his course with a beam wind and sea, which may have caused the cargo to shift, and the vessel to fall over on her beam ends.

2. That the said steamship was not overladen on leaving Cardiff on her intended voyage.

3. That, although the said vessel might with advantage have had more beam in proportion to her depth, the ratio of depth to beam was not so great that she might not, if properly and skilfully handled, have performed her voyage in safety with the cargo which she had on board.

4. That the ship was not properly ventilated for the safe carriage of all coal cargoes, for that she should have had two ventilators to each hold, one in the fore part, the other in the after part of the hold, just piercing the upper deck, and with a clear space under the deck between the ventilators, in order that there might always be a free current of air passing over the surface of the coals in the 'tween decks; but that there is no reason to suppose that the loss of the vessel was in any way due to the want of proper ventilation, the whole of the cargo being small coal, from which very little gas would be given off, and which had been exposed to the open air for some days, as well before as after it had been shipped, and before the vessel left, and during which time all or nearly all the gas would most probably have escaped.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 18th day of February 1880.

(Signed) H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

(Signed) GEO. H. FORSTER, }
" JOHN S. CASTLE, } Assessors.
" JOHN R. RAVENHILL, }

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on the 17th and 18th of February instant, when Mr. De Hamel appeared for the Board of Trade and Mr. Roche for the owners of the "Prometheus." Ten witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. De Hamel stated that the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court upon the following questions:—

"1. What, in the opinion of the Court from the evidence before them, was the cause of the loss of the steamship "Prometheus"?"

"2. Whether the said steamship was overladen on leaving Cardiff on her intended voyage?"

"3. Whether the said steamship had sufficient stability?"

"4. Whether the said steamship was properly ventilated for the safe carriage of coal cargoes, and if not in what respect such ventilation was deficient?"

Mr. Roche having addressed the Court for the owners, and Mr. De Hamel having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Prometheus" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Sunderland, of 1,621 tons gross and 1,043 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 160 horse-power. She was built at Sunderland in the

L 367. 297. 100.—3/80. Wt. 47. E. & S.

year 1877, by Messrs. Joseph L. Thompson and Sons, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Alexander Smith, of No. 40, West Sunnyside, Sunderland, and others, Mr. Smith being the managing owner. She left Cardiff at about 7 p.m., of the 1st of December last, with a cargo of coals, bound to Genoa, having a crew of 23 hands all told, and in charge of a duly licensed pilot. At midnight the pilot left her, and from that time she has never been seen or heard of. It is true that a vessel resembling her in some respects was seen on the 4th of December in the Bay of Biscay, lying over on her beam ends, and which we are told subsequently disappeared; but the only points of resemblance between that vessel and the "Prometheus" are that they both had white funnels with black tops, and that they were both brigantine-rigged; but as this description would apply to a great many other steamers it is hardly sufficient to warrant us in coming to the conclusion that the vessel which was seen was the "Prometheus." But even if it was the "Prometheus," the fact that she was seen lying over on her broadside will not help us very much to say what was the cause of her loss. For this we must look rather to the construction and form of the vessel, her fittings, and the nature and amount of the cargo which she had on board; and this information we have in the very complete body of evidence which has been laid before us.

From the very full and detailed plans of the vessel with which we have been furnished, and which have been explained to us by Mr. Robert Thompson, the designer and builder of the vessel, we learn that the "Prometheus" was a three-decked vessel, having two of her decks laid, the upper of wood and the main deck of iron, and with orlop beams below. Forward of her engines, which were amidships, were two holds, Nos. 1 and 2, separated from one another and from the engine-room by water-tight bulkheads, and with a collision bulkhead forward; and abaft the engine-room was No. 3 hold, with water-tight bulkheads forward and aft of it. There were thus five water-tight bulkheads, of which the collision bulkhead and the bulkhead abaft the engine-room went up to the upper deck, the other three terminating at the main deck. No. 1 hold was 44 feet long, No. 2 hold was 56 feet, and No. 3 hold 80 feet long; the engine-room being 37.9 feet. The vessel was fitted with water ballast tanks; one running from the engine-room bulkhead forward for a distance of 70 feet, and being divided by the water-tight bulkhead between No. 1 and No. 2 holds, thus forming a second bottom to No. 2 hold, and projecting 1.4 feet into No. 1 hold; and the other starting from the after engine-room bulkhead and extending 68 feet aft. There was no water ballast tank under the engine-room. The depth of the floor plates, we were told, was 1 foot 5 inches; the height of the forward water tank above the top of the floor plates was 1 foot 11 inches, and the height of the after water tank 2 feet 1. The two forward ones together contained about 120 tons of water, and the after tank about the same quantity. Coming to the lower hold, the portion of No. 2 lower hold immediately forward of the engine-room bulkhead for a length, I think, of about 20 feet, was partitioned off by a wooden bulkhead, so that it would serve either for cargo or as a thwartship coal bunker, as might be required. In the 'tween decks there was a wooden bulkhead between No. 1 and No. 2 holds, above and in prolongation as it were of the water-tight bulkhead in the lower hold. There were two wing bunkers extending from the bottom of the ship to the top of the upper deck, and in the 'tween decks those bunkers communicated with the upper part of the thwartship bunker. In the centre of the ship was a bridge-house 50 feet long, and rising some 6 feet 9 above the upper deck, and entirely inclosing the engine and boiler rooms; in this respect distinguishing the "Prometheus" from the other vessels of a somewhat similar construction which the Court has had recently before it. In the bridge-house were the officers and petty officers quarters, a galley and other rooms, and above it, on the fore part, was a chart-room, upon the top of which was the upper bridge, and abaft the chart-room, and resting not on the upper deck but on the top of the bridge-house, was an iron casing, rising 2 feet above the top of the bridge-house, and carrying the engine-room skylight. In the 'tween decks forward were the crew's quarters; and aft was the captain's room, with a large saloon and berths, intended for the accommodation of any of the owners who might wish to go on a voyage in her; and on the upper deck above the saloon was the smoking-room. The total length of the ship was 254.6 feet; her mean breadth 34.1 feet; and the depth of her hold, from the tonnage deck to the ceiling amidships, 23.5 feet.

I should add that round the fore part of the vessel and running aft as far as the fore hold were bulwarks; the rest of the ship had rails and stanchions, except in the stern, where there were bulwarks again, to protect the cabin companion.

The vessel being principally, I may say exclusively, employed in taking out coals and bringing back grain cargoes to this country, was fitted with permanent shifting boards extending in the 'tween decks from deck to deck, and in the lower hold for five planks down. These shifting boards were permanent, except of course within the squares of the hatchways, and were apparently well secured. There were also cut in the main deck holes about 8 feet by 4 feet for the purpose of trimming the cargo in the lower hold, and of allowing it to run down from the 'tween decks into the lower hold as it settled, thus keeping the lower holds well filled. Of such holes there were two in the after part of No. 1 hold, close against the bulkhead, two in the forward part of No. 2 hold, and four in No. 3 hold, two forward of and two abaft the hatchway. The holes were all cut midway between the centre of the ship and the side, so that they might serve to feed not only the centre but the wings.

Let us now see what cargo she took out. It consisted wholly, with the exception of the bunker coal, of small coal or screenings, collected partly at the collieries, partly at the shipping places. There were in all 1,809 tons of this small coal, besides 369 tons of bunker coal, making a total of 2,178 tons. According to the evidence of a man named Davis, the foreman trimmer, the order in which the holds were fitted was as follows: In the first place they put about 300 tons into No. 2 hold; they then went to No. 3 hold, and there put in 400 tons; then they filled the thwartship bunker with 170 tons; they then finished No. 2 hold with 200 tons; then they filled the side bunkers with 186 tons; then they put 320 tons into No. 1 hold; and lastly, they put about 480 tons into No. 3 hold. There must, however, be some mistake in this man's evidence, for the total of what he has given us makes up only 2,056 tons, whereas we know from the evidence of the owner, and from the persons who supplied the coals, that the quantity put on board was 2,178 tons. But however this may be, it is clear that a considerable space of time elapsed between the first portion of the coals being put into No. 3 hold and that hold being filled up. According to the evidence of one of the coal trimmers, the quantity first put into No. 3 hold nearly filled the lower hold, leaving only a small empty space in the after part of the hold. Accordingly, before filling up the hold, a coal trimmer was sent down to trim the cargo, and for this purpose he passed down through one of the holes which had been cut in the main deck aft, the hatchway being completely blocked up with coal. On clearing away the coal to get into the empty space aft, and striking a light, an explosion immediately took place. It does not, however, appear to have been a very serious matter, except that one of the men was slightly burnt, and the vessel was shaken; but no injury, so far as the evidence shows, was done to the vessel. When the loading was complete all the lower holds were full, and in the 'tween decks there were from 20 to 25 tons of coal in No. 1 hold, No. 2 hold was full, as was also No. 3 hold, except a little space in the fore part and an empty space in the after part sufficient to contain about 30 tons. The loading, we are told, took something like 60 hours altogether.

And here it is important that I should refer to an incident which had occurred on her previous return voyage, for we are trying to ascertain whether there is any cause which would account for the loss of this undoubtedly good vessel. It seems that on her last return voyage to this country she had put into Falmouth for orders, and having received directions to proceed to Dublin, she in getting under way touched the ground. The master finding that she did not make any water proceeded to Dublin, there delivered his cargo, consisting of grain, without finding a particle of it damaged, and then went on to Cardiff, where she was very properly put into dry dock, and her bottom carefully examined. And although some few scratches were found upon her, there was nothing, in the opinion of the surveyor, to show that she had sustained any injury. The crank shaft, however, seems to have been strained, and a new one was accordingly put into her. And it was owing to this circumstance that after the loading had been completed the vessel was detained at Cardiff whilst they were fitting in the new crank shaft, and this detained them, we are told, for 50 hours longer, during all of which time the hatches were kept open. When all was complete she was found to be drawing 20 feet 7 forward and 20 feet 9 aft, or a mean of 20 feet 8 inches.

Now the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What, in the opinion of the Court, from the

"evidence before them, was the cause of the loss of the steamship 'Prometheus'?" But it appears to us that the answer to this question had better be deferred until we have dealt with some of the other questions.

The next question is, "Whether the said steamship 'Prometheus' was overladen on leaving Cardiff on her intended voyage?" From the evidence of Mr. Thompson, the designer and builder of the ship, it seems that the vessel was originally constructed to carry from 2,100 to 2,200 tons of dead weight. As a matter of fact she had on board 2,178 tons, she was therefore very near the limit of the amount which she was designed to carry. At the same time it appears from a list of the cargoes of coal which she has carried on her six previous voyages, that although it is slightly in excess of what she is stated to have carried on two of those voyages, it is less than she carried on the three others; or, if we take the weight of cargo and bunker coal at 2,178 tons, and add to it 160 tons for the engines and boilers, it gives a total of 2,338 tons, which is only 40 per cent. above her gross tonnage, which the assessors think is by no means excessive.

Again, let us see what was her draught of water, and what was her freeboard. She drew, as I have stated, 20 feet 7 forward and 20 feet 9 aft, or a mean of 20 feet 8 inches. The total depth at the side from the bottom of the keel to the top of the deck was 25 feet 9; this would therefore give her a freeboard of 5 feet 1 inch, and as she was loaded in the Roath Dock, which we are told is two-thirds fresh water, she would, on getting to sea, rise from 2 to 3 inches, which would give her a freeboard of from 5 feet 3 to 5 feet 4 inches. So that the freeboard would be 2.7 inches for every foot depth of hold, which the assessors think would be a good margin. I should add that, according to Mr. Thompson, she was designed to have a freeboard of only 4 feet 6 inches, but that the owner in putting on the disc placed it so that the load line should be 4 feet 9 below the deck, thus giving her 3 inches more freeboard than was originally intended by the builder. There is, therefore, nothing either in the amount of the cargo or of the freeboard to lead us to think that the vessel was overladen. The fact, too, that there were only 25 or 30 tons of coal in No. 1 hold in the 'tween decks, leaving an empty space there for about 75 tons more, and that in No. 3 hold in the 'tween decks there was space for some 30 tons more, would diminish very considerably the weight of the cargo in the upper works.

The next question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether the said steamship had sufficient stability?" This is no doubt one of the most important questions in the case. Now we find that the breadth of the vessel was 34.1 feet, whilst the depth of her hold was 23.25, which would give a ratio of depth to breadth of .68, a very different co-efficient from that which we found in the other cases which have recently come before us, those of the "Tiara," the "Emblehope," and the "Lufra," in which the co-efficient varied from .73 to .76 and .77. At the same time it is a high ratio, and Mr. Thompson, the designer and builder of the ship, said very fairly that if they were building her now they would give her more beam. It must, however, be observed that the stability of a ship does not depend entirely upon the relation of its beam to its depth; other circumstances must also be taken into account. The vessel no doubt had water ballast tanks, which would tend to lift the cargo somewhat higher up; but there was no ballast tanks in the engine-room or in the fore part of the fore hold. There were also other matters connected with the construction of this vessel which must not be forgotten in estimating her stability and her power to resist a gale of wind. In the first place, the plating of the bottom was $\frac{1}{8}$ th more than is required by Lloyd's for a first-class 100 A 1 ship, the plating being $\frac{1}{16}$ ths instead of $\frac{1}{8}$ ths; the rivetting again for one quarter of her length from each end might have been $\frac{1}{4}$ ths, whereas it was $\frac{1}{8}$ ths; the orlop beams again were at every 10th frame, instead of being at every 12th frame; the sheer strake, which was $\frac{1}{4}$ ths of an inch thick, was carried 18 inches above the deck, and there were strong strips of doubling pieces put in between each butt. All this tended very materially to add to the strength of this vessel, more especially in the bottom, and so far to add to her stability. Whilst then the ratio of depth to beam was no doubt large, it was compensated to a certain extent by other parts of her construction, so that we are not prepared to say that she was unstable or unfit to carry a full cargo, like the other vessels to which reference has been made.

Nor ought we omit to call attention to other parts of the vessel, which seem to render her peculiarly well fitted to resist bad weather. In the first place she had bulwarks round the fore and after parts of the vessel to prevent the sea breaking over her, whilst on each side there were only rails and stanchions, so as to give no hold for the water

should any corner of the alleyway opening outwards inside, thus preventing alleyways or in the deck. She to the upper deck pumps, too, were pumps to every pipes in the engine-room the after part of cocks between similar cocks be cock opening from the forward communication opening the co they could bring holds, either di was also a de 18 inches above we are told, c a minute. As one from the do filling the tank the bilge injecti the vessel, but to the side of have been bett and cocks, and this vessel.

The next qu "Whether the "the safe car "respect such tors with whic upper deck, a No. 1 hold ju 14 inches; a the hatchway. way 4 feet squ all times, excep and which wou tion to which, 9 inches in di to the cabin, There was also the saloon wit in the 'tween the store-room 'tween decks t thence throug away. These which they ha holds. Now, tilators, the o would act as a ventilate those we are told, q is difficult to between these produce perfe the small hatcher the after part solid body of s rent of air. might carry of but they wou There was a g Thompson, th said that the require. No vessel was bui which have t coal gas, they What they w be to put t and the other would add w namely, that ventilator to a free current off the gas.

should any come on board her. Again, at the extremity of the alleyways in the bridge-house there were iron doors opening outwards, and which could be fastened on the inside, thus preventing the water lodging either in the alleyways or in the cabins or deck-houses, and so loading the deck. She had bunker shoots from the top of the bridge to the upper deck, entirely inclosed in iron casing. Her pumps, too, were in every respect complete. She had hand-pumps to every hold; and in addition to the usual suction pipes in the engine-room, to a well in the centre, and to each bilge, she had one suction pipe from the engines to the compartment forward of the collision bulkhead, another to a well in No. 1 hold just forward of the end of the ballast tank; and another to a well in No. 3 hold just abaft the ballast tank and under the screw tunnel. There were also two 2½-inch cocks opening from No. 3 hold into the engine-room, two similar cocks between the well and the after part of the tank in the same hold; two similar cocks between No. 2 hold and the engine-room, and two similar cocks between No. 1 and No. 2 holds; and one 3-inch cock opening from the well in No. 1 hold into the fore part of the forward tank. All the tanks were of course in communication with the pumps in the engine-room, and by opening the cocks, which was done from the upper deck, they could bring the pumps to bear upon any or all of the holds, either directly or through the tanks, or both. There was also a donkey boiler, the fire bars of which were 18 inches above the bars of the main fires. And the pumps, we are told, could throw altogether about 4 tons of water a minute. As regards the sea cocks there were five of them, one from the donkey boiler, one from the main boiler, one for filling the tanks, one for the scum pipe from the boiler, and the bilge injection; they were none of them in the bottom of the vessel, but were all in the bilge, and were all attached to the side of the ship. Nothing in our opinion could have been better than the arrangement of the pumps, pipes, and cocks, and in fact generally all the appurtenances of this vessel.

The next question on which our opinion was asked is, "Whether the said steamship was properly ventilated for the safe carriage of coal cargoes, and if not in what respect such ventilation was deficient?" The ventilators with which this vessel was furnished just pierced the upper deck, and were thus situated. There was one in No. 1 hold just abaft the hatchway with a diameter of 14 inches; a similar one in No. 2 hold just forward of the hatchway. Aft the bridge there was a small hatchway 4 feet square, which we are told could be left open at all times, except when the weather was excessively severe, and which would act as a ventilator to hold No. 3; in addition to which, there was abaft the hatchway a ventilator 9 inches in diameter. There were also three ventilators to the cabin, and one over each of the wing bunkers. There was also, we are told, a small store-room forward of the saloon with a door opening from it into the cargo space in the 'tween decks, and there was a grating in the top of the store-room, so that the gas could escape from the 'tween decks through that door into the store-room, and thence through the grating into the smoke-room, and so away. These are, I believe, the whole of the arrangements which they had on board this vessel for ventilating the holds. Now, it was said by Mr. Roche that the two ventilators, the one in No. 1 hold, the other in No. 2 hold, would act as an upcast and a downcast, and thus effectually ventilate those two holds; but seeing that hold No. 2 was, we are told, quite full of coal, and this, too, small coal, it is difficult to see how a current of air could have passed between these two ventilators, which is what is required to produce perfect ventilation. The same might be said of the small hatch in the fore part, and the small ventilator in the after part of No. 3 hold, between which there was a solid body of small coal, which would prevent any free current of air. The small hold and each of these ventilators might carry off gas from the coal immediately beneath them but they would be useless to ventilate the holds generally. There was a great deal of good sense in the remark of Mr. Thompson, the designer and builder of the vessel, when he said that the ventilation was not what we should now require. No doubt it was thought sufficient when this vessel was built in 1877, but since the numerous inquiries which have taken place in regard to the explosion of coal gas, they are not such as they would now put in. What they would now do Mr. Thompson told us would be to put two ventilators into each hold, one forward and the other aft, that was what Mr. Thompson said; but I would add what appears to me to be equally essential, namely, that there should be a clear space left from one ventilator to the other, over the surface of the coal, so that a free current of air might be created, which would carry off the gas. Mr. Wales, indeed, whose experience in mines

is very great, more so probably than it is in ships, considers that it is not sufficient to have ventilators in the 'tween decks only, but he would have ventilators carried down to every hold with a clear space of about 18 inches over the surface of the coal in each hold; but with every respect for Mr. Wales we do not think such a system is either necessary or desirable. To leave a clear space in the lower holds we should have to put on the lower hatches, and to close up the holes in the lower decks, and thus prevent the cargo in the 'tween decks from filling up any empty spaces in the lower holds; so that the chances of the cargo shifting in the lower holds, which is always dangerous, would thus be greatly increased. Nor do we quite see what possible harm could arise, even if some gas did accumulate in the lower holds, seeing that no light could get to it, and without a light it could not explode. As a fact any gas that might accumulate in the lower hold would, if the lower hatches and holes in the deck were left open, pass up through the coal into the open space, which, in our opinion, ought always to be left in the upper part of the 'tween decks, and if there was a free current of air established, it would when it got there be at once carried off. This, in our opinion, is all that is wanted; and any more complicated plan, such as that suggested by Mr. Wales, would not only be very onerous to shipowners, but in our opinion useless.

I now return to the first question, namely, "What, in the opinion of the Court from the evidence before them, was the cause of the loss of the steamship 'Prometheus?'" And first, could she have sustained any injury from grounding at Falmouth? but in our opinion this suggestion is disposed of by the fact that she was put into dry dock at Cardiff, her bottom carefully surveyed by a competent surveyor, and that she was found not to have sustained any injury whatever. Again, could there have been an explosion of gas on board which caused her loss? But in the first place the evidence shows that the coal with which this vessel was laden does not give off any very large quantities of gas; moreover, it was all small coal, which, having been broken up, and left for some days to lie at the collieries or at the shipping wharves, would probably have given off the greater part, if not the whole, of its gas. Again, they were 60 hours engaged in loading her, and after the loading the vessel lay with her hatches off for 50 hours more waiting for the new crank shaft to be put into her. On the whole, it seems in the highest degree improbable that the vessel could have been destroyed by an explosion of coal gas. It is true that there was a slight explosion of coal gas whilst they were loading her, but that can easily be explained, the after hold having been first filled, and then left with the hatches and holes stopped up with small coal, and with a small empty space in the after part where any gas that might remain would naturally collect; and, of course, when a light was brought there it would explode; but even then the explosion does not appear to have been a very serious matter.

I think then that we cannot regard either of these causes as having been likely to lead to the loss of this ship; but there was a suggestion made by Captain Parsons, the gentleman who had been her master ever since she was built, but who had asked to stay on shore for this voyage, which is, in our opinion, entitled to consideration. Captain Parsons had, as I have said, asked to be allowed to stay at home this time, and it is a curious circumstance that this is the third occasion in which a vessel of which he was master has been lost during a voyage when he had asked to be allowed to stay at home. The result in this case was that the vessel went out in charge of the first mate, who had been with him for about 2½ years, and Captain Parsons' suggestion is that the mate, being anxious to make a quick passage, it being his first command, may have held on too long on a southerly course with a gale from the eastward. Captain Parsons' words are as follows, "I can only suppose that the mate was trying to make a quick passage, and kept her too long in the trough of the sea, and so she may have shifted her cargo. I think that that is quite possible. I always brought her head to the sea in those heavy gales of wind." This is, in our opinion, the most probable explanation of the loss of this vessel, namely, that she held on for too long a time in a beam sea, which may have caused her cargo to shift, and thus threw her over on her beam ends. Captain Parsons told us that in a very heavy gale of wind he always brought her head to sea, and very properly so, for no vessel can lie for a very long time in the trough of the sea without danger of the cargo, however well secured, shifting. In the present case no doubt the ratio of depth to beam was considerable, and, as Mr. Thompson very fairly said, if she were built now we should give her more beam; still, on the other hand, she was heavily plated, strongly built in her sides and bottom, exceptionally well provided with pumping

power, and with protection to her engines and boiler space, and her 'tween decks had nearly 100 tons of coal less than they could have held. There is then nothing in the vessel or her cargo or equipments which would lead us to suppose that she could not have weathered any gale that she might have encountered had she been skilfully and prudently handled; and we can only attribute her loss to an over anxiety on the part of the officer in charge to make a quick passage. It is another instance of what I am told

by the assessors is a not unfrequent occurrence, that vessels are often lost by masters in their first command.

(Signed) H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

(Signed) GEO. H. FORSTER,
JOHN S. CASTLE, } Assessors.
" JOHN R. RAVENHILL, }

" JOSEPH

The Merchant S

In the matter of the form
Court, Moot Hall, N
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Wreck Commission
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Dated the 19th of Feb

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(Signed) GEORGE
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