

(No. 369.)

"EAGLE," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

In the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Guildhall, Swansea, on the 22nd and 23rd August 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by R. C. MAY, Esq., C.E., and Captain BEASLEY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the British steamship "EAGLE," of Swansea, on the 29th July last, whilst on a voyage from Swansea to Dublin.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, found, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto,—

1. That, except in regard to the state of the discharge pipe and the position of the discharge valve, the ship was in a good and seaworthy condition when she left Swansea on the 29th of July last.

2. That the cause of the loss of the vessel was the breaking of that part of the discharge pipe which was inside the port bunker, whereby the water was allowed to flow into the bunker, and thence into the ship.

3. That not only should the discharge valve have been attached to the skin of the ship instead of being as it was at least 6 feet from the side, but that access should have been afforded to the discharge pipe along its own length, so that in the event of a fracture in the pipe means might have been at once adopted to prevent the influx of the water.

4. That Charles Mattathias Jacobs, the superintending engineer, was to blame for not having seen that the discharge valve was removed to the side of the ship, and the discharge pipe carried round the after part of the bunker, the cost of the necessary alterations not exceeding, according to his own admission, about 60*l*.

5. That the omission of William Cambridge, the chief engineer, to examine that part of the discharge pipe which passed through the port bunker was a serious neglect of duty on his part.

6. That the only means taken to stop the leak when the water was found to be rising in the bilges was to turn on the donkey engine, but that after the rush of water occurred at about midnight no means were taken to ascertain where the leak came from, or to stop it; that had the mouth of the pipe been stopped from the outside with a piece of sacking the water would have ceased to flow into the ship, and by turning on the donkey pump she might then have been freed from water, and sail got on her, and the vessel probably got into a place of safety.

7. That the chief engineer was not justified in abandoning the vessel so speedily, knowing, as he did, that she was fitted with water-tight compartments, and that there was no chance of the boiler bursting, more especially having regard to the fact that the danger was in that part of the vessel which was under his charge.

8. That whilst the said Charles Mattathias Jacobs is to blame for having allowed the discharge pipe and valve to remain in the state in which they were the principal blame of the casualty rests with the chief engineer, William Cambridge.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court ordered the certificate of the said William Cambridge as a first class engineer to be suspended for six months, but recommended that during the period of the suspension he be allowed a second class engineer's certificate.

The Court made no order as to costs.

Dated the 3rd day of September 1879.

(Signed) H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

(Signed) ROBERT C. MAY, } Assessors.
" THOS. BEASLEY, }

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Swansea on the 22nd and 23rd August instant, when Mr. Strick appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Inskip for the owner, and Mr. Lawrence for

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the master and first engineer of the vessel. Eight witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Strick asked the opinion of the Court upon the following questions:—

"1. Whether the vessel when she left Swansea was in good and seaworthy condition?"

"2. What was the cause of the loss of the vessel?"

"3. Whether access to the discharge pipe from the discharge valve to the side of the ship should not have been provided as well for the purpose of examination as for affording facilities to stop the influx of water in the event of a fracture in the pipe?"

"4. Whether proper means were taken by the superintending engineer to ascertain whether the engines with the valves, pumps, discharge pipe, and other appurtenances of the engines were kept in good working order?"

"5. Whether proper attention was paid by William Cambridge, the chief engineer, in ascertaining the condition of the engines and the various parts thereof? and especially whether his omission to examine the part of the discharge pipe which passed through the bunker (as admitted by him) was not a serious neglect of duty on his part?"

"6. Whether, when it was discovered that the water was rising in the bilges, proper means were taken to ascertain the cause thereof? and whether any means could have been taken, and were taken, to keep the water under and save the vessel?"

"7. Whether the chief engineer was justified in abandoning the vessel so speedily, especially having regard to the fact of the danger having arisen in that part of the vessel which was under his charge?"

"8. Whether the master, first mate, chief engineer, or other persons, or either or any of them, is or are in default?"

Mr. Strick further stated "that in the opinion of the Board of Trade the certificate of William Cambridge, the chief engineer, should be dealt with."

Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Inskip having been heard for their respective parties, and Mr. Strick in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions that had been submitted for its consideration. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Eagle" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Swansea, of 316 tons gross and 193 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 85 horse-power. She was built at Dundee in the year 1858, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Newall Moore, of Loulas, near Neath, who was also the managing owner. She left Swansea at about 1 p.m. of the 28th of July last bound to Dublin, and having on board a crew of 13 hands all told, and a cargo of 290 tons of coal, besides about 54 tons in her bunkers. Nothing particular occurred until about 11 p.m., when they had got to the northward of the Bishop's Rock, off the Pembroke-shire Coast. At this time the chief engineer, observing more than the usual quantity of water in the bilges, turned the donkey engine on to clear it, but soon afterwards, seeing that there was a deficiency of water in the boiler, he examined the feed pumps and found that the forward one was not working properly. He accordingly called the second engineer, turned the donkey engine on to the boiler, and as soon as the boiler was properly filled he directed the second engineer to turn the donkey engine again on to the bilges, whilst he went to examine the air pumps. Finding that there was what he called a drag upon the after one, he went on deck and told the captain that the valve on the air pump had given way and that it was necessary to go easy. The captain asked him if he could do so safely and he said yes. It was now about half-past 11, and the ship, we are told, was about 12 miles to the north of the Bishop's. The engineer then returned to the engine-room, and found, as he tells us, the water above the stoke hole plates. The engines were then kept going slow until about midnight, when there was a sudden rush of water from the bottom of the port bunker, which carried away coals and everything before it. The chief engineer thereupon at once stopped the engines, shut down the discharge valve, ordered the second engineer to open the safety valve, and himself rushed on deck, and told the captain that the ship was sinking under their feet. Upon receiving this report the master gave orders to call the hands on deck and to get out the boats. The jolly boat, being the smallest boat, was the first put into the water; and immediately the two engineers, two of the seamen, and the steward got into her, and the rope having been let go, and there being only one oar in her, she rapidly drifted astern, and the weather being foggy

he was soon lost sight off. The next boat which was put over the side was the port quarter boat, which was a lifeboat, and the second mate and a fireman having by the master's orders got into her, she also drifted astern, the rope by which she should have been held having unfortunately been let go. The captain and mate, three firemen, and one seaman, who were the only persons remaining on board, then got out the starboard quarter boat, and at about 10 minutes to 1 they got into her, and having secured her by a rope to the ship's stern they lay off, fearing that as the vessel sank the boiler might blow up. There they remained holding on to the ship's stern until nearly 2 o'clock, when the steam having all blown off they hauled the boat up alongside, and the master, mate, and I think one of the firemen having gone on board, they succeeded in saving the ship's papers, and some of their effects, and at about a quarter to 7 o'clock the vessel finally sank. In the meantime the port lifeboat had fallen in with the jolly boat, upon which the two engineers, and two of the men had got into her, leaving one hand only in the jolly boat, and they then pulled towards the ship with the jolly boat in tow. Owing, however, to the representations which had been made by the engineers that the vessel was likely to go down at any moment, the lifeboat kept away from the ship, but the jolly boat with two of the hands pulled alongside the captain's boat, and having been taken on board, the jolly boat was sent adrift. When at length the ship had gone down the port boat with the two engineers, the boatswain, and two of the hands pulled alongside, and having received directions from the master to steer in a S.E. direction, both boats pulled for the land, and the same afternoon they arrived in safety somewhere in the neighbourhood of Fishguard Bay, the port boat at about 3 o'clock and the starboard boat at about 5 o'clock.

These then being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "whether the vessel when she left Swansea was in a good and seaworthy condition?" I have stated that the vessel was originally built in the year 1858, so that she was about 21 years of age at the time of her loss; she had, however, only been in Mr. Moore's possession since 1872, when he gave 6,000*l.* for her. In the following year Mr. Moore had her engines overhauled by a firm of the highest respectability, Messrs. Dudgeon, of Millwall, at an expense of 1,900*l.* In the year 1877 he employed Messrs. Harvey and Co., of Hayle, in Cornwall, to supply her with new boilers at a cost of 980*l.*, and at the same time the engines were again overhauled at an expense of 262*l.* In 1878 the vessel was stranded on Hayle Bar, and the repairs then done to her cost about 680*l.* In December of the same year further repairs were done to her by the Neath Abbey Company at an expense of 280*l.*; and in April 1879, the vessel having broken her screw shaft at Belfast, was repaired by the firm of McIlvain and Lewis at a cost of 367*l.* It will be seen, therefore, that during the time Mr. Moore has had her he has spent very large sums upon her to put her into a state of efficiency. In addition to this, Mr. Moore not having himself any practical knowledge of shipbuilding, had in April 1878 appointed a Mr. Jacobs, a consulting engineer, at a salary of 40*l.* a year, to superintend the repairs to the ship; and from that time all the repairs were done under the supervision either of Mr. Jacobs, or of his assistant, Mr. Milner. Mr. Jacobs, I should observe, holds a first class certificate as an engineer, and he was one of the engineer surveyors to Lloyd's for this district until quite recently, when, owing to some new regulations issued by Lloyd's that their surveyors should not practice privately, he resigned the latter appointment rather than sacrifice his private practice. So far therefore as Mr. Moore is concerned, he seems to have done everything that could reasonably have been expected of him to render her a good and efficient vessel; he spared no expense in the repairs, he placed her in the hands of the most respectable firms, and he employed a gentleman whom he had every reason to believe was thoroughly competent for the duty to superintend the repairs. If therefore the vessel was not "in a good and seaworthy condition" when she left Swansea on the 28th of July last it was certainly not Mr. Moore's fault; he had done all he could to make her so. Whether in fact she was in a seaworthy condition will be seen from the answers to the other questions which have been put to us.

The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "what was the cause of the loss of the vessel?" and it will require some description of the character and condition of the engines with which she was fitted to answer it. It seems that the vessel had on board two direct-acting inverted jet condensing engines, which had been put into her when she was originally built in 1858; they were therefore about 21 years old. We are told that although they had not all the modern improvements they

were fairly constructed engines for the time at which they were made. A rough sketch of a part of the machinery, which was given in by the chief engineer, and which is annexed to this report, will help to explain the construction and arrangement in the immediate neighbourhood of the place where the water is stated to have come into the ship. It will be seen from this sketch and from the evidence of the witnesses who were examined before us, that close alongside the condenser, which was on the port side of the vessel, were two air pumps, immediately over which was the hot well, and above that the discharge valve. In a direct line from the discharge valve to the ship's side, and passing through the port bunker on its way, was the discharge pipe, which, according to Mr. Milner, was about 6 feet long, but according to Mr. Jacobs was somewhat longer. Where the pipe passed through the bunker frame there was an expansion joint, having a horizontal or lateral movement to allow for the expansion of the metal, but no vertical or up and down play to allow for the working of the ship. The top of the pipe, where it issued from the ship's side, was about 18 inches below the level of the load line; when then the vessel was light the mouth of the pipe would be well out of the water, but when she was loaded, seeing that she would then generally be brought down to the load line, the mouth of the pipe would be below the surface of the water, and the sea would consequently have free access to the pipe as far as the discharge valve. It will thus be seen that if, when the vessel was laden and the bunkers were full of coal, a fracture occurred in that part of the discharge pipe which was inside the bunker, the water would continue to run into the bunker, and that the shutting of the discharge valve, which was at the further end of the pipe and at least 6 feet from the vessel's side, would not stop the flow of water. And according to the chief engineer it was by the fracture of this part of the discharge pipe that the water had got into the ship.

Mr. Inskip, however, contended that it had not been satisfactorily proved that the casualty arose from the breaking of the discharge pipe; he suggested that possibly it might have been occasioned by some injury to one of the air pumps or to the condenser, and that thus the water might have got from the discharge pipe into the bilges; but this can hardly be so, for in that case the flow of water would have been stopped when the chief engineer closed the discharge valve, which he did before he left the engine-room. Something also was said about one of the sea-cocks having been left open by the second engineer when he left the engine-room, and no doubt if a communication had been thus opened with the sea it might account for the ship ultimately filling, but it would not account for the water which was first found in the bilges, nor for the rush of water which we are told came from the port bunker. On the whole, seeing that there is no reason to suppose that the water got into the bunker from the deck, for there was not sufficient sea on at the time, or that it came in from a leak or fracture in the ship's side; the only conclusion to which we can come is that the water came in through a fracture in that part of the discharge pipe which was inside the port bunker. If this pipe were fractured what would probably occur would be this, the water would at first come in slowly, the coals absorbing a considerable quantity of it, and a portion only running out of the door at the bottom of the bunker into the bilges. After a time, when the coals had become thoroughly saturated and the pressure at the fracture had become greater owing to the sinking of the ship in the water, the flow would increase, until at length it would, as the engineer said, issue with a rush from the bottom of the bunker, carrying the coals and everything before it. This is how the casualty probably occurred, and there is no other way in which the facts that have been described to us can be accounted for.

And now let us see whether there was anything in the condition of the discharge pipe which would make it probable that it would break. The Court, unfortunately, has been left in great doubt both as to the age and as to the condition of this pipe. The master, who had been in the vessel ever since she was purchased by Mr. Moore, told us that he had occasionally been in the bunkers, but had never observed this pipe; that having nothing to do with the engine-room department he knew nothing about the condition of the pipe. The chief engineer also, who had been in the vessel for four short voyages, told us that since he had joined her he had never been in the bunkers at all and had never examined the pipe either externally or internally. He added that he had never had any opportunity of examining this pipe, because the bunkers, ever since he had joined her, had always been full of coal, but this, as will presently be seen, was clearly not the case. The second engineer told us the same story. Mr. Jacobs


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also said that his attention was never specially directed to this pipe, and the only person who could give us any information about it was Mr. Milner, Mr. Jacobs' assistant, and the gentleman who had superintended the repairs at Hayle in 1878. According to Mr. Milner, the discharge pipe was of cast iron with a casing of wrought iron, and bound over on the outside with rope or spun yarn. He told us that he had looked through it, and that to his recollection it was not pitted or corroded, but he could not exactly remember what appearance it presented internally. He told us also that he went two or three times into the bunker and examined it externally; that he could see an inch or so of the casing at each end, and that from this he judged it to be of wrought iron, but that he had not had the rope or spun yarn removed, and that he knew nothing of the condition of the wrought-iron casing, whether it was water-tight or whether it fitted close to the pipe or not, nor could he tell us what was the external condition or the thickness of the cast-iron discharge pipe itself. Mr. Inskip indeed wished us to assume that the discharge pipe had been renewed when the engines were overhauled by Messrs. Dudgeon in 1873, but there is no evidence whatever of this. Messrs. Dudgeon's bill for the repairs done at that time was brought in, but although there were items relating to the discharge valve there was nothing to show that the discharge pipe had been renewed or even removed at that time, and the engines might easily have been taken out without disturbing the part of the discharge pipe which was inside the bunkers, owing to the expansion joint at the bunker frame. There is, therefore, nothing to show that this may not have been the very same pipe which was put into the vessel when she was originally built in 1858, nor have we any information as to when this wrought-iron casing and the rope were put round it, and whether they were intended to strengthen it or to protect it from the coal in the bunkers. Considering, however, that the interior of this discharge pipe was alternately exposed to the action of the sea water and of the air, according as the vessel was laden or light, and that we have no evidence whatever as to its condition or thickness, it certainly is not by any means improbable that it should have broken.

This then brings us to the third question on which our opinion has been asked, namely, "whether access to the discharge pipe from the discharge valve to the side of the ship should not have been provided for, as well for the purpose of examination as of affording facilities to stop the influx of sea water in the event of a fracture in the pipe?" Now I think that the best answer that can be made to this question is to read some of the instructions which are given to surveyors by the Board of Trade with a view to direct their attention to what we may call the weak points in the engines. In section 83 at page 43 of the Instructions of 1878 we find the following remarks: "All inlets or outlets in the bottom or side of a vessel near to, at, or below the deep load water line, other than the outlets of watercloset, soil, scupper, lavatory, and urinal pipes, must have cocks or valves fitted between the pipes and the ship's side or bottom. Such cocks or valves must be attached to the skin of the ship, and be so arranged that they can be easily and expeditiously opened or closed at any time; and it is well that the cocks, valves, and the whole length of the pipes should be accessible at all times." And further on it says: "In the case of the outlets of waterclosets, soil, scupper, lavatory and urinal pipes, which are below the weather deck, there should be an elbow of good substantial metal, other than cast iron or lead, extending above the load water line; and the pipe connected with this elbow should, if of lead, have a sufficient bend to provide for expansion in the pipe, or any movement from the working of the ship. Pipes, no matter of what material they may be constructed, are never to be fitted in a direct line between the aperture in the ship's side, and its connection with the deck, or closet, or other fitting." Then on a fly-leaf we find the following observations: "Cocks or valves, standing exceptional distances from the ship's plating, that is, where the necks are longer than is necessary for making the joint are not to be passed without the sanction of the Board of Trade, and one condition of their being passed is that they must be made of brass or gun metal, and well bracketed," and then "cast-iron stand pipes or cocks through which hot brine has to pass must never be passed."

What then are the points to which the attention of surveyors is more especially directed by these Instructions? First, that all inlets and outlets in the ship's bottom below the load line should if possible have valves or cocks attached to the ship's skin, and that where they cannot be so arranged, as in the case of waterclosets, urinals, &c., the pipe should have "an elbow of substantial metal other than

"cast iron or lead, extending above the load water line." Secondly, that "pipes, no matter of what material they may be constructed, are never to be fitted in a direct line between the aperture in the ship's side and the fitting," but that they should have a sufficient elbow to allow for expansion and for the working of the ship. Thirdly, that pipes between a cock or valve and the ship's side must be always "made of brass or gun metal, and well bracketed," and that "cast-iron pipes through which hot brine has to flow must never be passed." These are the three principal points to which the attention of surveyors is directed as affording elements of insecurity, and on all these points the "Eagle's" engines were especially defective. In the first place, the discharge valve instead of being attached to the skin of the ship was at a distance of at least 6 feet from it; secondly, the discharge pipe between the discharge valve and the ship's side, and which when the vessel was laden was constantly exposed to the action of the salt water, and of hot brine too, was made not of brass or of gun metal but of cast iron; and thirdly, the discharge pipe instead of having an elbow of good substantial material extending above the load water line was a mere cast-iron pipe, fitted in a direct line from the bunker framing to the ship's side, allowing no play either for expansion or for the working of the ship. The engines had, I will not say all the defects they could have had, but at any rate defects quite sufficient to endanger the safety of the vessel, and against which surveyors of ships are especially warned.

The next question then on which our opinion is asked is, "whether proper means were taken by the superintending engineer to ascertain whether the engines, the valves, the pumps, the discharge pipe, and other appurtenances of the engines were kept in good working order?" As far as regards the engines, valves, pumps, and other parts there is nothing to show that Mr. Jacobs did not take proper measures to ensure their being kept in good working order; and we are told that on the voyage in question the engines up to 11 o'clock were working remarkably well. But as regards the discharge pipe and the position of the discharge valve, considering the very ample powers which Mr. Jacobs had from Mr. Moore, we think that he has been guilty of neglect. Mr. Jacobs admits that the arrangement of the discharge pipe and valve was very defective and likely to endanger the safety of the vessel; he told us also that to remove the discharge valve to the side of the ship, carrying the discharge pipe round the after end of the bunker, would have cost about 60*l.*; Mr. Milner says 50*l.*, and one of the assessors, a very experienced engineer, thinks it could have been done for from 30*l.* to 40*l.* Knowing all this, Mr. Jacobs, although he is well aware that Mr. Moore is quite ready to put the vessel into a good and efficient state, never suggests to Mr. Moore that this alteration should be made, or that there was any danger in allowing it to remain as it was. We cannot acquit Mr. Jacobs of grave neglect seeing that he was specially employed by Mr. Moore to see that the vessel was kept in a proper state of efficiency. As to Mr. Milner he excuses himself by saying that he was only Mr. Jacobs' subordinate, and that all that he had to do when he was sent to Hayle was to see that the repairs were properly carried out according to orders, and not to suggest any improvements in the vessel.

The fifth question then is, "whether proper attention was paid by William Cambridge, the chief engineer, in ascertaining the condition of the engines and the various parts thereof, and especially whether his omission to examine that part of the discharge pipe passing through the bunker (as admitted by him) was not a serious neglect of duty on his part?" As regards the other parts of the machinery there is nothing to show that William Cambridge, the chief engineer, did not pay proper attention to them, but as regards that part of the discharge pipe which was within the port bunker, we have it upon his own admission that he never once examined it either externally or internally from the time he joined the vessel. He told us that he could not do so because the bunkers were always full of coal, but this, as I have said, is not true. We have it in evidence that two of the voyages since William Cambridge has been engineer were from Swansea to Londonderry and back, and that the time occupied each way is about 39 hours. The consumption of coals also is, we are told, about 10 tons a day, so that she would on those voyages consume between 15 and 20 tons each way. Her bunkers also we are told contained about 54 tons or about 27 tons each, so that at the end of the voyage the bunkers would be left with some 7 to 10 tons in each; and as the discharge pipe was situated high up in the bunker it is clear that at the end of the Londonderry voyages the pipe must have been exposed, and that he could have seen it if he had taken the trouble to go into the bunker. He knew, or ought to have known, that this

was the weak part of the engines; that it was the part to which the water would have access when the vessel was laden; and that if when the bunkers were full of coal the discharge pipe became fractured in any way it would be extremely difficult to prevent the water flowing from the sea into the bunker and thence down into the bilges. It was of the utmost importance therefore that this discharge pipe should be seen and carefully attended to; and yet he never went to look at it from the time he joined the vessel till she was lost. For this we think that he was greatly to blame.

The sixth question is, "whether, when it was discovered that the water was rising in the bilges, proper means were taken to ascertain the cause thereof, and whether any means could have been, and were taken, to keep the water under and save the vessel?" and the seventh is, "whether the engineer-in-chief was justified in abandoning the vessel so speedily, especially having regard to the fact of the danger having arisen in that part of the vessel which was under his charge." It seems that the only means which were taken to stop the leak when the water was seen to be rising in the bilges was to turn the donkey engine on to pump it out; but after the rush of water came at about 12 o'clock, nothing whatever seems to have been done; the chief engineer at once stopped the engines, shut down the discharge valve, and rushed up on deck, telling the master that the vessel was sinking under their feet, and leaving the second engineer with orders to lift the safety valve and come up on deck. After he got on deck, his whole attention seems to have been devoted to getting out of the ship without delay, although he ought to have known that there was no chance of her immediately sinking, the vessel being fitted with water-tight compartments, nor of her blowing up, the pressure of steam in the boiler having, he told us, been reduced, by turning the donkey engine feed on to about 4 lbs. When asked by Mr. Strick what he had done to stop the leak after the rush of water was seen to be coming from the port bunker he was not able to say that he had done anything. As to whether any and what means might have been taken to stop the leak, it was suggested by Mr. Jacobs that they should have stopped up the mouth of the discharge pipe from the outside by a piece of sacking, it would perhaps have been difficult to do, but the assessors think that it might and ought to have been attempted, and although it would necessarily have stopped the working of the engines, the

donkey engine might then have been turned on to the bilges, the water pumped out, and then sail made until assistance could have been obtained from some passing steamer, and in this way the vessel might perhaps have been saved. That it did not occur to the master to do this does not surprise us, the engines were not in his department, and he knew nothing about them; indeed, it does not appear that he even knew where the water was coming in; he called to the engineer to come back, and not to leave them, and I do not know that we could expect him under the circumstances to do more. On the other hand, the chief engineer seems to have known from the first where the water was coming in, and had he stayed by the vessel he might, from the knowledge which he had of the construction of the machinery, have advised the master how to act; and at all events by telling the master, what he says he knew perfectly well, that there was no danger of the boiler blowing up, have given them time to hit upon some means of saving her. In our opinion the chief engineer was not justified in abandoning the vessel as he did, especially as the accident had occurred in that part of the vessel which was under his charge.

We think that this man was greatly to blame, first, for not having examined that part of the discharge pipe which was inside the bunker, and which he knew, or ought to have known, was the weak point of the machinery; and secondly, for having abandoned the ship so hastily when his technical knowledge might have been of great use to the master. Under all the circumstances of the case, and considering that it is to his neglect and misconduct that the loss of this vessel is mainly to be attributed, we thought that, notwithstanding the good characters which he has received from his former employers, we could not do otherwise than suspend his certificate for six months, and we accordingly did so. On the application, however, of his solicitor we agreed to recommend that he should be allowed a second engineer's certificate during the period of the suspension.

No application was made for costs by any of the parties, and therefore no costs were given.

(Signed) H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.
(Signed) ROBERT C. MAY, } Assessors.
" THOS. BEASLEY, }

In the matter of the for
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attending the stran
ship " RIVER LUNE
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L'Orient to Ardros

The Court, having c
stances of the above-m
for the reasons stated in

1. That the stranding having been kept by the N.W. course, and to be made for the tide and c
 2. That the master take a cast of the lead, the weather.
 3. That although a might perhaps have wa vented his running the sufficient evidence bef desirable to erect a fog
 4. That the vessel w seamanlike manner aft alone in default.
- For these wrongful a the certificate of Georg for three months from t
The Court made no c
Dated the 3rd day of
(Sig

We concur in the ab
(Signed) ELPH

" J. P.

Ann

This case came before August, when Mr. T Trade and Mr. Dicke Eight witnesses havin Trade and examined, the Court upon the fol
" 1. What was the c
" 2. Whether the ve
" seamanlike manner f
" was stranded?
" 3. Whether the m
" vessel so long on a
" made proper allowan
" 4. Whether the to
" fiable, especially hav
" weather?
" 5. Whether the w
" Island contibuted to
" 6. Whether the m
Mr. Tyndall further of opinion "that the dealt with."

Mr. Dickenson havi Tyndall having in his desired to know whe fog signal was necess proceeded to give its been submitted for its the case were as follow

The " River Lune Port of Liverpool, of She was built at Wall land, in the year 1868 property of Mr. John